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At the Intersection of Public Policy and Private
Process: Court-Ordered Mediation and the
Remedial Process in School Funding Litigation
MOLLY TOWNES O'BRIEN*
I begin with caution. Each human being is unique, as is each society.
It follows logically, then, that no two conflicts are the same. There is
no magic formula which, once discovered, can be used to end all
conflicts. '
I. INTRODUCTION
The story of school finance reform has been, as Mark Yudof, President
of the University of Minnesota, once wrote, "like a Russian novel: it's long,
tedious, and everybody dies in the end."'2 When the Supreme Court of Ohio
issued its order referring DeRolph v. State3 to mediation, the court hoped,
perhaps, to transform an otherwise dreary opus into a story with a happy
ending. The school finance case presented complex legal, political, public
policy, and administrative issues and had dragged on for a decade. 4 The
Supreme Court had declared the constitutional rights and obligations of the
parties almost five years earlier, 5 but implementation of a remedy for the
violation of state constitutional rights remained elusive. 6 The court deemed
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Akron School of Law. I am deeply
indebted to professors Brant Lee, E. Stewart Moritz, Elizabeth Reilly and Tracy Thomas
for their comments on earlier drafts of this article and for their help and support with the
writing process. Thank you also to Andrea Doneff, Vice President, Resolution Resources
Corporation, for her insightful comments and editorial help.
I George J. Mitchell, 8 Disp. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2002, at 4, 6 (qualifying his
response to requests that he compare the prospects for conflict resolution in Northern
Ireland and the Middle East).
2 Mark G. Yudof, School Finance Reform in Texas: The Edgewood Saga, 28 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 499, 499 (1991).
3 DeRolph v. State, 758 N.E. 2d 1113 (Ohio 2001) (DeRolph Mediation).
4 1d. at 1116.
5 DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 737 (Ohio 1997) (DeRolph I) (holding that the
public school funding system fails to meet the Ohio Constitution's requirement that the
legislature provide for a "thorough and efficient system of common schools").
6 See generally DeRolph v. State, 754 N.E.2d 1184 (Ohio 2001) (DeRolph III)
(discussing the efforts by the legislature to cure constitutional infirmity of the school
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the case to be "the most difficult challenge" it had faced in all the years the
case had been pending.7 Here, perhaps, was an opportunity to rewrite the
school finance story and, at the same time, demonstrate that court-ordered
mediation ought to be viewed not merely as a viable alternative for the
resolution of private disputes, but more importantly as a valuable remedial
tool in complex public institutional reform litigation.8
Scholars have long recognized that the public law litigation9 process is
"suffused and intermixed with negotiating and mediating processes at every
point."' 10 Recently, scholars seeking to build a model for an effective
remedial process in public disputes have suggested deliberative processes,
multi-lateral decision-making, consensus building, and community
dialogue."l In DeRolph, it seemed there was a prominent opportunity to put
ADR to its toughest test. Could court-ordered mediation provide the bridge
between legal wrong and judicial remedy in a school finance reform case?
funding system and finding those efforts insufficient), vacated by DeRolph v. State, 780
N.E.2d 529 (2002) (DeRolph IV); see also infra text accompanying notes 111-35
7 DeRolph Mediation, 758 N.E.2d at 1116.
8 Institutional reform litigation typically requires the courts to scrutinize the
operation of large public institutions. Theodore Eisenberg and Stephen C. Yeazell, The
Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465, 467
n.6 (1980). Examples of types of cases generally classified as "institutional" or
"structural" include challenges to conditions in prison and in mental hospitals and
litigation involving voting districts and school desegregation. Id. at 467-68 n.6. See also
Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 GEO. L.J. 1355, 1357
n.1 (1991).
9 For purposes of this article, I use the terms "public law litigation" and
"institutional reform litigation" interchangeably. Citations to more refined definitions of
the terms used by other scholars may be found in Sturm, supra note 8, at 1357 n.1.
10 Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281, 1284 (1976). See also Margo Schlanger, Beyond the Hero Judge: Institutional
Reform Litigation as Litigation, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1994, 1999-2000 (1999) (arguing that
negotiated settlement is the primary source of judgment in prison reform litigation); Marc
Galanter, Worlds of Deals: Using Negotiation to Teach about Legal Process, 34 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 268, 268 (1984) (coining the term "litigotiation" to describe a process in which
litigation is the necessary context for negotiation).
I I Michael A. Rebell & Robert L. Hughes, Schools, Communities, and the Courts: A
Dialogic Approach to Education Reform, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 99, 113-19 (1996)
(proposing a community engagement dialogic model for resolving conflict related to
school reform); Sturm, supra note 8, at 1427-34 (proposing a deliberative model of
public remedial decision making). In addition, in practice, courts and practitioners have
turned increasingly to alternative dispute resolution mechanisms to resolve public
disputes. Rebell & Huges, supra at 117 (listing school-based controversies that used
alternative dispute resolution techniques in recent years).
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Would mediation provide a process for the improved accomplishment of
justice? 12
Within a few short months of the court's order requiring mediation, the
answer to these questions appeared to be a resounding "No!" On March 21,
2002, the mediator reported that the DeRolph mediation had failed. 13 Any
hope that the experiment would produce a happy ending to the school finance
litigation or would reflect well on the mediation process was dashed. Rather
than a shining example of the potential of court-ordered mediation, DeRolph
would stand as a very public example of the failure of the process.
This article will examine the DeRolph case, particularly the court's
decision to turn to mediation, and will suggest that the case should serve as a
cautionary tale, with lessons for future courts in how to structure court-
ordered mediation. 14 This exploration of the DeRolph mediation is based in
part on discussions with experienced and talented mediators. 15 It is intended
as the beginning of what I hope will be a continued scholarly discussion of
the potential for court-ordered mediation to provide procedural justice in the
remedial phase of institutional reform litigation. 16 The article begins (Part II)
by sketching out some of the difficulties that courts encounter when
designing a remedy in a school finance case and some of the reasons why, at
least in the abstract, a mediation process may assist the parties and the
12 Professor Menkel-Meadow points out that the accomplishment of justice has both
substantive and procedural aspects. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Practicing "In the Interests
of Justice" in the Twenty-first Century: Pursuing Peace as Justice, 70 FORDHAM L. REv.
1761, 1763 (2002) (noting that the process by which we seek justice is a component of its
achievement).
13 Final report of Howard Bellman, at http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/derolph/
bellman3-21 .pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2002).
14 See infra Part IV, in which I attempt to identify the reasons for the failure of the
DeRolph mediation and suggest guidelines for future court-ordered mediation in school
finance cases.
15 1 would specifically like to acknowledge and thank Ansley Barton, Howard
Bellman, Harold Clarke, Andrea Doneff, Mori Irvine, Amy Totenberg, and Doug Yam
for giving me the benefit of their extensive knowledge and experience in mediation.
Many of the ideas presented in this article flow from the discussions I have had over the
years (and recently, of course) with these highly skilled and exceptionally thoughtful
trailblazers in alternative dispute resolution.
16 School finance reform litigation generally takes place in at least two phases, a
liability phase and a remedy phase. In school finance reform litigation, "[t]he remedial
process begins when the court finds that the defendants are liable for violating the
plaintiffs' rights and must remedy the harm caused by their unlawful conduct." Sturm,
supra note 8, at 1360.
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court. 17 Next, in Part III the article provides a brief history of the DeRolph
litigation, placing the abstract concepts against the concrete details of a
particular case. 18 Part IV explores some possible reasons for the failure of the
DeRolph mediation and suggests what might have been done to create a
better possibility for success. 19
In spite of the failure of the DeRolph mediation, I posit that the
mediation process may play a productive role in the future of school finance
cases. Court-ordered mediation may permit the re-structuring of the remedial
process in a way that that addresses minority rights which often are lost or
minimized in the traditional legislative process. 20 Further, a participatory
mediation process holds promise for achieving remedial results in a school
finance case that are both educationally viable and politically sustainable.
Mediation may open new avenues for the resolution of litigation at the
intersection of private process and public policy.
Indeed, there is a potential for voluntary or court-ordered mediation to
play a role in the future of the DeRolph case itself. At this writing,
implementation of a remedy for the constitutional violations identified by the
Court remains elusive. 21 As the parties continue to search for a way to
provide an educational system that meets Ohio constitutional mandates, they
may once again turn to mediation. This article represents an effort to learn
from past failure and to plan for future success in school finance mediation
and other public law litigation.
17 See text and accompanying notes infra pp. 395-405.
18 See text and accompanying notes infra pp. 405-17.
19 See text and accompanying notes infra pp. 417-35.
20 For a provocative discussion of a more radically re-structured democratic process,
see, Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism,
98 COLUM. L. REv. 267, 314-39 (1998), which describes a redefined democratic self-
government, "directly deliberative polyarchy," involving collective problem-solving by
citizens and groups suited to local diversity. Id. at 315. Court-ordered mediation of
institutional reform may, to a limited extent, participate in the kind of democratic
experimentalism envisioned by Professors Dorf and Sabel.
21 Following the failure of the mediation process described in this article, the
Court granted the State's motion to reconsider DeRolph III and reinstated DeRolph I
and II as the law of the case. See generally DeRolph IV, 2002 Ohio Lexis 3025; see
also infra text accompanying notes 237-44.
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II. WHY CONSIDER MEDIATION IN SCHOOL FINANCE LITIGATION?
A. The Particular Remedial Difficulty of School Finance Litigation
The remedial process in all institutional or structural reform litigation is
fraught with theoretical and practical difficulty, 22 but it has been particularly
prolonged and troubled in school finance litigation. 23 This is so not only
because of the substantive and procedural complexity of school funding
reform litigation, but also because of its broad implications for society's
governance, fisc, and future.
Education is widely perceived to be the engine of the economy, the
safeguard of liberty, and the key to meritocracy. As the Supreme Court
pointed out in Brown v. Board of Education: "In these days, it is doubtful
that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied
the opportunity of an education." 24 Similarly, a representative democracy
cannot be reasonably expected to succeed without an educated citizenry. 25
Education is expected not only to produce citizens capable of self-
government and to encourage cohesion among diverse peoples, 26 but it is
also expected to be "the great equalizer of the conditions of men-the
22 Susan Sturm, Resolving the Remedial Dilemma: Strategies of Judicial
Intervention in Prisons, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 805, 807-09 (discussing the problems facing
judges in devising remedial orders in prison reform litigation); GERALD N. ROSENBERG,
THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991) (suggesting
that courts lack the capacity to bring about meaningful social or educational change).
Many scholars have debated the efficacy and authority of the courts in institutional
reform. William S. Koski & Henry M. Levin, Twenty-Five Years after Rodriguez: What
Have We Learned? 102 TCHR[S]. C. REc. 480, 496 (2000) (citing a body of literature,
"much of it skeptical of judicial efficacy," relating to judicial policy making process in
institutional reform cases).
23 School finance reform cases in New Jersey and Texas provide vivid examples of
troubled remedial processes. Litigation spanning three decades and still on-going in New
Jersey is chronicled in Margaret E. Goertz, Steady Work. The Courts and Reform in New
Jersey, in STRATEGIES FOR SCHOOL EQUITY 101, 107-13 (Marilyn J. Gittell ed., 1998).
See also Yudof, supra note 2, at 499-500 (analyzing decades of school finance reform in
Texas.)
24 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
25 As Thomas Jefferson wrote, "If a nation expects to be ignorant and free, in a state
of civilization, it expects what never was and never will be." LAWRENCE A. CREMIN, THE
AMERICAN COMMON SCHOOL 29 (1951) (quoting Thomas Jefferson).
26 CARL F. KAESTLE, PILLARS OF THE REPUBLIC 6-7 (Eric Foner ed., 1983)
(discussing the views of Benjamin Rush and Thomas Jefferson).
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balance wheel of the social machinery. '27 Theoretically, 28 and to some extent
demonstrably, 29 education is the vehicle of social mobility in modem
American society.
State constitutions recognize the importance of education and charge
state legislatures with providing for a system of public schools.30 Although
there are deep divisions of opinion among scholars, advocates, and jurists on
questions of curriculum, accountability, discipline, etc., there is broad
consensus that each child should have an opportunity to an adequate 3'
education at state expense. 32 In spite of this broad consensus, however,
27 Horace Mann, l0th Annual Report, in AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOL LAW 26 (Kern
Alexander & M. David Alexander eds., 1998). Horace Mann believed that if education
could be "equably diffused, it [would] draw property after it, by the strongest of all
attractions; for such a thing never did happen, and never can happen, as that an intelligent
and practical body of men should be permanently poor ... " Id. at 26.
28 Id. at 25.
29 JOEL SPRING, AMERICAN EDUCATION, 76-105 (9th ed. 2000) (analyzing the
economic effects of educational opportunity and attainment); see also SOUTHERN
EDUCATION FOUNDATION, MILES TO Go: ARKANSAS (2002) (one of a series of reports
providing data that links educational opportunity and attainment to economic
advancement).
30 Allen W. Hubsch, The Emerging Right to Education Under State Constitutional
Law, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1325 app. at 1343-48 (1992) (collection of state constitutional
provisions); see also KERN ALEXANDER & DAVID M. ALEXANDER, AMERICAN PUBLIC
SCHOOL LAw, 30-32 (4th ed. 1998) (summarizing the underlying principles that are
common to most state constitutional educational provisions and summarizing the
differences among several categories of provisions); William E. Thro, The Role of
Language of the State Education Clauses in School Finance Litigation, 79 EDUC. L. REP.
19, 19 n. l (1993) (collection of state constitutional provisions).
31 Of course, the content of an "adequate" education remains highly controversial.
Even the term "adequate education" is, itself, a term laden with history. The quest for an
"adequate" education, which is the goal of the current "wave" of educational finance
reform litigation, was a strategic choice pursued by education advocates in the wake of
the failure of lawsuits seeking "equality" or "equity" in education. William H. Clune, The
Shift from Equity to Adequacy in School Finance, 8 J. OF EDUC. POL'Y 376 (1994)
(describing adequacy and equity theories in school finance); Michael Heise, Equal
Educational Opportunity, Hollow Victories, and the Demise of School Finance Equity
Theory: An Empirical Perspective and Alternative Explanation, 32 GA. L. REV. 543,
545-46 (1998) (describing successive strategy choices in educational finance litigation).
32 Even the free market economist, Milton Friedman, who suggested that
governments might require a minimum level of education but require parents to pay for
it, conceded that preservation of the public good requires public subsidy of education.
Milton Friedman, The Role of Government in Education, in ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST 125-27 (Robert A. Solo ed., 1955). But see MYRON LIEBERMAN,
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history demonstrates that democratic processes have failed to provide for the
educational needs of every child, particularly those who are poor, who are
members of minority groups, or who live in rural areas.33 The probable
reasons for the failure of democratic processes to provide universally
available, high quality education are complex and manifold, but certainly
include localism, 34 private pursuit of educational advantage, 35 and children's
PRIVATIZATION AND EDUCATIONAL CHOICE 303 (1989) (arguing that parents should pay
for their children's education from their own income).
33 The continuing inequality and inadequacy of public schools for poor children,
minority children, and children in some rural areas has been documented at trial, in
scholarly studies, and in the popular media. See, e.g., DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d 733, 743-44
(Ohio 1997) (Trial revealed that some Ohio schools were contaminated by asbestos,
carbon monoxide, sewage overflow, and kerosene fumes; schools in poor districts lacked
heat and basic supplies). Particularly vivid depictions of the disparities in educational
resources can be found in CHILDREN IN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS: WITH BILL MOYERS,
Saint/Hayden Co., South Carolina ETV and Nebraska ETV (1996). See generally
JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES (1991) (an in-depth look at the inequality of
the school systems in New Jersey); JOHN D. OWEN, SCHOOL INEQUALITY AND THE
WELFARE STATE (1974) (examining the financial inequalities present in American public
school systems and asserting that decentralization of control of financing and middle
class bias of bureaucracies have created and maintained a system of unequal treatment of
poor and minority communities). For a history of school finance litigation in 44 states,
see Michael Rebell, Education Adequacy, Democracy and the Courts, at
http://www.accessednetwork.org/resources/EDUADEQ.PDF (last visited July 26, 2002).
34 Schooling has historically been viewed as a function of local governments. While
local control may have some advantages in terms of efficiency and flexibility, local
funding mechanisms have contributed significantly to inequity in school funding. Richard
Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-The Structure Of Local Government Law, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 1 (1990). Professor Briffault points out:
Localism reflects territorial economic and social inequalities and reinforces them
with political power. Its benefits accrue primarily to a minority of affluent localities,
to the detriment of other communities and to the system of local government as a
whole. Moreover, localism is primarily centered on the affirmation of private values.
Localist ideology and local political action tend not to build up public life, but rather
contribute to the pervasive privatism that is the hallmark of contemporary American
politics. Localism may be more of an obstacle to achieving social justice and the
development of public life than a prescription for their attainment.
Id. at 1-2.
35 I have argued elsewhere that during the mid-twentieth century, as educational
credentials became the currency of social mobility, and as the middle class sought to
insulate their children from downward mobility, schools developed in response to the
demands of parents who sought to give their children a competitive advantage. The
continuing pursuit of individual educational advantage conflicts and competes with the
public goal of providing universally available, high quality education. Molly Townes
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
relative lack of political and economic power. 36 In searching for a reason that
our society continues to fail to meet children's needs, Professor Martha
Minow suggests, "[p]erhaps because of our troubled heterogeneity, with
historic racism and intergroup distrust, we do not view other people's
children as ours in many important ways."'37
Whatever the reasons for the failure of democratic processes to provide
fully and equally for all children's educational needs, during the past quarter
century education advocates have repeatedly turned to the courts seeking to
enforce educational rights defined in state constitutions. 38 While educational
equity or adequacy is the goal of school finance reform litigation, the chief
target of such suits has traditionally been the system of taxing and allocating
the resources that support public schools. The "classic" argument under
girding school finance reform litigation is that over reliance on local property
taxes to fund public schools results in well-funded schools in wealthy
districts and poorly-funded schools in poor districts.39 Plaintiffs have argued
that the funding system that creates such disparities is unconstitutional under
state constitutional provisions that require state legislatures to provide, for
example, an "efficient," "thorough," or "uniform" system of public schools. 40
Seeking "equity" in school funding, plaintiffs have pursued equalization of
"input measures, such as total educational and per-pupil spending levels." 41
Taxing and spending levels, however, are not the sole targets of school
finance reform litigation. Recent school finance reform litigation advances a
theory that "all children are entitled to an education of at least a certain
quality and that more money is necessary to bring the worst school districts
O'Brien, Private School Tuition Vouchers and the Realities of Racial Politics, 64 TENN.
L. REV. 359, 373-75 (1997).
36 Paul E. Peterson, An Immodest Proposal, DAEDALUS, Fall 1992, at 151
(contrasting the success of the elderly in moving out of poverty and strengthening public
programs to meet their financial and medical needs with the failure of children's
advocates to achieve the same results); Martha Minow, What Ever Happened to
Children's Rights?, 80 MINN. L. REV. 267, 295 (1995) (suggesting that the lack of a vote
or another lobby may be one of the reasons for the failure of children's initiatives).
37 See Minow, supra note 36, at 295.
38 Molly McUsic, The Use of Education Clauses in School Finance Reform
Litigation, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 307, 310 (1991) (analyzing the success of state
constitutional claims seeking reform of school financing).
39 Mark G. Yudof, School Finance Reform: Don't Worry, Be Happy, 10 REV. LITIG.
585, 585-86 (1991) (recapitulating the "classic" argument).
40 See ALEXANDER & ALEXANDER, supra note 27, at 30-32 (summarizing state
constitutional provisions relating to school funding).
41 Heise, supra note 31, at 545.
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up to the minimum level mandated by the state education clause. '42
Although these lawsuits seek better resources, facilities and more funding,
their focus is on equitable educational quality, or, on educational outputs,
rather than on expenditure levels alone.43 Thus, remediation under a state
constitution's educational clause may require an assessment of available
educational resources, needs and goals, followed by the development and
implementation of a plan for meeting those needs and achieving those goals.
Given the breathtaking scope of school finance reform litigation, it
should come as no surprise that defining a remedy has been problematic in
school finance reform litigation. More than twenty-five years of post-
Rodriguez4 litigation in 44 states45 has yielded ambiguous results and has
led many to question the ability of the courts to bring about meaningful
change in school finance. 46 State courts, in turn, have repeatedly identified
violations of state constitutional education requirements, 47 but have
frequently failed to provide an effective remedy. 48
42 William E. Thro, Judicial Analysis During the Third Wave of School Finance
Litigation: The Massachusetts Decision as a Model, 35 B.C. L. REv. 597, 603 (1994).
43 Id. at 600-03. See also Heise, supra note 3 1, at 545-46.
44 In San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), the Supreme
Court held that funding disparities between school districts did not violate the 14th
Amendment Equal Protection guarantee. After suffering defeat in the Rodriguez case,
education advocates turned to state constitutional education clauses to pursue the goal of
educational equity. Michael Rebell, Rodriguez Revisited: An Optimist's View, 1998 ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 289, 292-93 (1998).
45 The Advocacy Center for Children's Educational Success with Standards
(ACCESS) provides on-line updates of school finance litigation in forty-four states, at
http://www.accessednetwork.org/statesmain.html (last visited Aug. 15, 2002). The
website states that Hawaii, Indiana, Mississippi, Nevada, and Utah are the states without
education finance litigation. Id.
46 Heise, supra note 3 1, at 547 ("[E]ven successful school finance equity lawsuits do
not appear to have altered centralization or spending levels in ways (or to the degree)
most likely sought by litigants."); see also Note, Unfulfilled Promises: School Finance
Remedies and State Courts, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1072, 1072 (1991) (arguing that
legislative inertia and judicial deference to the legislature and executive contribute to the
difficulty in securing a remedy in school finance reform cases). But see G. Alan Hickrod,
et al., The Effect of Constitutional Litigation on Education Finance: A Preliminary
Analysis, 18 J. EDUC. FIN. 180, 207-08 (1992) (suggesting that in states where courts
found funding schemes unconstitutional, combined state and local per-pupil expenditures
increased).
47 Violations of state constitutional education requirements were found in Alaska,
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts,
Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and
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School finance reform litigation, as a species of public law litigation,49
faces particular remedial problems that are not present in the typical private
suit that seeks damages or negative injunctive relief.50 Like other structural
or institutional reform litigation, school finance reform litigation is
"sprawling and amorphous," 51 affecting many parties who are not before the
court, some of whom may have no entitlement to a remedy in the case at
hand, but who may be in a position to thwart the eventual implementation of
Wyoming. See, e.g., Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806, 808 (Ariz.
1994); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 189 (Ky. 1989); Helena
Elementary Sch. Dist. v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 685 (Mont. 1989), amended by 784 P.2d
412 (1990); Abbott ex rel. Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 363 (N.J. 1990); Brigham v.
State, 692 A.2d 384, 386 (Vt. 1997); Seattle Sch. Dist. v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 77 (Wash.
1978); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 884 (W.Va. 1979). State courts that have upheld
school financing systems against constitutional challenges include Alabama, Colorado,
Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Virginia, and Wisconsin. See, e.g., Lujan v. Colo.
State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1011 (Colo. 1982); McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d
156, 168 (Ga. 1981); Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635, 636 (Idaho 1975); Hornbeck
v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758, 780 (Md. 1983); Skeen v. State, 505
N.W.2d 299, 320 (Minn. 1993); Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359, 361 (N.Y.
1982), appeal dismissed for want of substantial federal question, 459 U.S. 1138 (1983);
Fair Sch. Fin. Council of Okla., Inc. v. State, 746 P.2d 1135, 1137 (Okla. 1987); Olsen v.
State, 554 P.2d 139, 143 (Or. 1976); Danson v. Casey, 399 A.2d 360 (Pa. 1979);
Richland County v. Campbell, 364 S.E.2d 470, 472 (S.C. 1988); Scott v. Commonwealth,
443 S.E.2d 138, 142 (Va. 1994); Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568, 570 (Wis. 1989).
48 Heise, supra note 31, at 547 ("[E]ven successful school finance equity lawsuits do
not appear to have altered centralization or spending levels in ways (or to the degree)
most likely sought by litigants."); Rebell & Hughes, supra note 11, at 112 ("[C]ourt
involvement rarely provides a fully satisfactory solution to complex educational
controversies."). But see Hickrod, supa note 46, at 206-07 (noting that in states where
courts found funding schemes unconstitutional, combined state and local per-pupil
expenditures increased); Molly A. Hunter, All Eyes Forward. Public Engagement and
Educational Reform in Kentucky, 28 J.L. & EDUC. 485, 516 (1999) ("Kentucky has
implemented a systemic package of curricular and governance reforms and tied them to
funding reform. It has maintained an unusually strong commitment to equity in
funding .... [Tihe state of learning in Kentucky is improving.").
49 See generally Chayes, supra note 10, at 1281-1304 (describing the characteristics
of public law litigation in contrast to traditional bi-polar private law suits).
50 William H. Clune, New Answers to Hard Questions Posed by Rodriguez: Ending
the Separation of School Finance and Educational Policy by Bridging the Gap Between
Wrong and Remedy, 24 CONN. L. REv. 721, 723 (1992) (noting that devising a remedy in
school finance reform cases requires enormous creativity).
51 Chayes, supra note 10, at 1284.
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the court's order.52 Further complicating the remedial process, state
constitutional norms provide only guidelines for the remedy rather than the
specifics. 53 While educational rights can be identified in principle, imbuing
the rights with meaning in the real world requires an almost endless number
of small decisions relating to public policy, educational philosophy, and
economic management. 54 Formulation of a remedy requires choices among a
wide variety of possibilities. 55 Further, the task of making choices among
various remedial possibilities is made even more difficult by the constantly
changing demographics of schools and the inconsistent ebb and flow of tax
dollars available in a volatile economy. 56 Moreover, outcomes, standards,
and measures of success are highly contested and-even when they are
agreed upon-fragile. 57 The remedial fact-finding required to make reasoned
choices in this situation is essentially forward-looking, requiring expertise
and insight into the merits of various proposals for an on-going plan for the
remediation of violations of norms defined in the state constitution.58
School finance litigation is, perhaps, even more problematic for the
courts than other types of institutional reform litigation because the
defendants include a co-equal branch of government, the state legislature,
acting within the ambit of the legislature's traditionally acknowledged area
52 Sturm, supra note 8, at 1364-65; Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92
YALE L.J. 585, 604 (1983) (noting that remedies in discrimination cases often impose
substantial burdens on non-wrong doers).
53 Even when courts have endeavored to give specific content to the terms used in
constitutional education clauses, the result still states principles in broad rather than fine
detail. See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Edu., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 205-06 (Ky.
1989) (defining an "efficient" system of common schools to have nine minimal essential
characteristics, including being free to all children, being uniform across the state,
providing an "adequate" education, etc.).
54 See Yudof, supra note 39, at 588-97 (describing multiple options available to
legislatures as they formulate plans to equalize school spending).
55 Id.; see also DeRolph III, 754 N.E.2d 1184, 1209-13 (Ohio 2001) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (examining a range of options available to the court and to the legislature).
56 For an excellent insight into the complexity of the problems facing school
reformers, see John Charles Boger, Education's Perfect Storm? Racial Resegregation,
High Stakes Testing & School Inequities, 81 N.C. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2003).
57 For a description of the fragility of remedies in school desegregation cases, see
Amy Stuart Wells, No Accountability for Diversity: Standardized Tests and the Demise of
Racially Mixed Schools, 81 N.C. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2003).
58 But see Yudof, supra note 39 at 595-98 (noting the difficulty of predicting public
response to and fiscal impact of legislative choices, and asserting that "horse-trading,"
rather than rational models governs legislative choice).
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of expertise. 59 And school finance cases ask the court to address not just any
taxing and spending issue, but the largest taxing and spending item on the
legislative agenda. 60 The enormous amount of money at stake puts school
finance issues in competition with all other budget issues. Small changes
required in school finance may create ripple effects throughout the state
budget. Large changes may create a tidal wave that upsets important
programs or that requires reform of the entire system of state taxation.61
Courts may also hesitate to enter into the remedial fray of school finance
because implementation of rights to schooling necessarily depends on the
cooperation of political actors who may be opposed to the goals of the
court's order and who have the de facto power to delay, disrupt, or block its
implementation. 62 This raises not only theoretical jurisprudential concerns,
but also practical concerns about the power and legitimacy of the court.63
Within the context of a state government, the court ultimately relies on the
59 See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 41 (1973)
("[W]e continue to acknowledge that the Justices of this Court lack both the expertise and
the familiarity with local problems so necessary in the making of wise decisions with
respect to the raising and disposition of public revenues."). Note that the Ohio
Constitution vests the judicial power of the state in the courts, the power of the executive
in the governor, and the power of the legislature in the general assembly. See OHIO
CONST., art. IV, § 1; art. III, § 5; art. II, § 1; see also Michael D. Blanchard, The New
Judicial Federalism: Deference Masquerading as Discourse and the Tyranny of the
Locality in State Judicial Review of Education Finance, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 231, 249-52
(1998) (discussing the separation of powers and political question doctrine rationales as
they arise in education finance cases).
60 Ohio Legislative Service Commission, "Budget in Brief," at
http://www.lbo.state.oh.us/124ga/budget/BudgetInBrief/bibI24.htm (last visited Sept. 14,
2002).
61 See, e.g., DeRolph 1II, 754 N.E.2d 1184, 1209-10 (Ohio 2001) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (explaining that if the Court were to declare the state's education budget
unconstitutional, $1,400,000,000 would be returned to the state budget for reallocation).
62 The history of Brown v. Board of Education and its progeny demonstrates that
persistent resistance, delay, and frequent return trips to court can avoid the social change
that the enforcement of the legal right would require. See generally GARY ORFIELD &
SUSAN E. EATON, DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION, THE QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V.
BOARD OF EDUCATION (1996); see also STEPHEN C. HALPERN, ON THE LIMITS OF THE
LAW 304-21 (1995) (discussing the difficulty of enforcing desegregation in the context of
political and popular resistance).
63 See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
("Disregard of inherent limits in the effective exercise of the Court's 'judicial Power' may
well impair the Court's position as the ultimate organ of 'the supreme Law of the
Land' . . . .").
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respect of the legislature and the executive not only for its stature and
authority, but also for its budget.
The remedial problem is particularly thorny. The court is not capable on
its own of devising and imposing a remedy that would be sufficiently
democratic to satisfy institutional legitimacy concerns in a representative
democracy. On the other hand, if the court returns the task of devising a
remedy to the legislature, it returns the problem to a democratic process that
has already failed to meet constitutional educational requirements-a process
that, given the power of the vested interests opposing reform, is likely to
continue to fail. 64
B. The Potential for Mediation
Although the remedial process in public law litigation may take many
forms, 65 mediation-or, a process for "developing a consensual remedy
through joint fact-finding and collaborative decision-making assisted by a
[neutral] third party" 66-holds special promise for achieving satisfactory
results in school finance reform litigation. In important ways, the strengths of
mediation speak directly to the difficulties of designing and implementing a
remedy in complex, contested public law litigation. Mediation provides a
flexible, participatory process that could serve to improve both the quality
and legitimacy of the remedy in school finance reform cases.
Mediation, broadly defined, is a structured conciliation process that uses
a neutral party to facilitate discussion, negotiation, and, if possible, resolution
of a dispute.67 The mediator has no power to impose a resolution, but instead
64 In this regard, school finance reform litigation is analogous to prison reform
litigation, about which Professor Sturm wrote, "[c]ourts correctly perceive, either initially
or after years of noncompliance, that the underlying causes of the legal violation disable
the defendants from complying with a general directive to cease violating the law."
Sturm, supra note 8, at 1362-63.
65 Professor Sturm identifies the various models for remedial process to include
traditional adjudication, the bargaining model, the legislative or administrative hearing
model, the expert remedial formulation model and the "consensual remedial formulation
model," which I call "mediation." See id. at 1365-77.
66 Id. at 1373-74. Professor Sturm uses the term "consensual remedial formulation
model" to describe the kind of flexible process that I envision when I use the term
"mediation" in this article.
67 Mediation has also been defined as a procedure for resolving controversies based
on complete agreement, using a third party neutral who has no preference for settlement
terms, and has no authority to impose a solution. See JAMES J. ALFINI ET AL., MEDIATION
THEORY AND PRACTICE 1 (2001).
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works with the parties to find a mutually agreeable solution to the problems
at hand by providing a forum for exchange of information and for the
generation of creative solutions that meet the fundamental interests of all of
the parties. 68
Providing an opportunity for collaborative problem-solving and creative
thinking about alternative solutions may be particularly valuable in school
finance reform, where the content of the remedy is not dictated by the finding
of a legal violation.69 The first-and perhaps most important-potential
benefit of using a consensus-building process to design the remedy is the
improved quality of the remedy. 70 A mediation process may employ the
services of various experts and may bring the expertise of the various
participating parties to bear on the remedial problems. 71 Participation in a
face-to-face negotiation process leads to better information production,
enables parties to educate each other, to pool knowledge, to build on the
expertise of various participants, and, ultimately, to arrive at high-quality
results. 72
The exchange of information and values that takes place in a consensus-
building process may not only improve the quality of the proposed solution,
but may also increase its legitimacy. Mediation gives the parties control over
the form of the remedy in a dispute and often results in solutions that are
more satisfactory to the parties than any resolution that could have been
imposed by court order. Further, mediation may be structured in a way that is
accessible to the various constituencies who will ultimately be affected by
the resolution of the dispute. In this way, "mediation is a process that takes
seriously the philosophy of democratic decision-making. ' 73 It may be
68 STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, FRANK E.A. SANDER & NANCY ROGERS, DISPUTE
RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION AND OTHER PROCESSES 103 (3d ed. 1999).
69 See text and accompanying notes supra, at 53-58; see also Sturm, supra note 8, at
1377.
70 See Jody Freeman & Laura 1. Langbein, Regulatory Negotiation and the
Legitimacy Benefit, 31 E.L.R. 10811 (2001) (evaluating empirical data relating to
environmental regulatory negotiations and concluding that the consensus-building
process improved rule quality).
71 Id; see also SUSAN L. CARPENTER & W. J. D. KENNEDY, MANAGING PUBLIC
DISPUTES 167-68 (2001) (discussing the role of technical resource experts).
72 CARPENTER & KENNEDY, supra note 71, at 124-26 (discussing the value of
parties' educating each other about the problem and the data). In the DeRolph case, as
discussed below, the failure of the parties to share important information with each other
and with the Court led to the entry of an order based on incorrect budget numbers. See
infra notes 130-33.
73 ALFINI, supra note 67, at 1.
[Vol. 18:2 20031
COURT-ORDERED MEDIATION IN SCHOOL FUNDING
structured to consider the views of all of the affected parties. In school
finance reform litigation, where a diverse group of organizations, systems
and individuals will be affected by the selected remedy, mediation may
supply the important benefit of providing a forum for these constituencies to
voice their concerns, interests and values.
Moreover, when the parties and the various non-party stakeholders in the
litigation have played an important role in formulating the remedy,
compliance with the mediated outcome is generally as high or higher than
compliance with adjudicated outcome.74 The implementation of a remedy
devised through a participatory, consensus-building process may also be
easier to achieve "because obstacles to implementation would likely surface
and be addressed during negotiations. ' 75 Additionally, the mediation process
may work to improve communication among parties, increase understanding,
and, perhaps even create a transformative dialogue that permanently alters
the dynamics of the relationships among the parties.76 The best possible
outcome for mediation is not only to resolve the conflict at hand, but also to
lay the groundwork for improved future interaction. In the realm of school
finance, the need for the interested parties to continue to interact is patent:
Budgets must be hammered out every year; student populations ebb and
flow; standards of achievement change. In this context, the most attractive
feature of mediation may be its potential for creating a transformative
dialogue and improving future discussion of school finance issues.
III. THE DEROLPH CASE: A BRIEF HISTORY
The history of the DeRolph case provides a lens for viewing the
problems of school finance litigation that are described in the abstract above
74 Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. Maiman, Mediation in Small Claims Court:
Achieving Compliance Through Consent, 18 L. & SOC'Y. REV. 11,23 (1984) (describing
empirical research showing high levels of satisfaction and compliance with mediated
settlements). But see Roselle L. Whissler, Court-Connected Mediation in General Civil
Cases: What We Know from Empirical Research, 17 OHIO. ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 641,
695 (2002) (stating that empirical studies comparing mediated settlements to non-
mediated settlements do not demonstrate that mediation produced increased compliance
or reduced post-settlement disputing).
75 See generally Freeman & Langbein, supra note 70, at 10814 ("Surely the parties
would be more likely to implement a rule they helped to develop, and less inclined to
sue."); see also id. n.34 & 38.
76 Robert A. Baruch Bush, The Unexplored Possibilities of Community Mediation:
A Comment on Merry and Milner, 21 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 715, 733-36 (1996)
(discussing the transformative mediation theory).
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and the potential for mediation to provide an improved resolution. In 1991,
five Ohio school districts filed suit on behalf of Nathan DeRolph and other
students, 77  alleging that the public school funding system was
unconstitutional under the section of Ohio's constitution that requires the
General Assembly to provide enough funding to secure a "thorough and
efficient system of common schools throughout the State."'78 During a trial
that lasted 30 days, plaintiffs presented an overwhelming body of evidence
demonstrating the inequality, inefficiency, and inadequacy of schools under
the existing funding system. 79 The evidence was largely uncontested by the
defendant, the State Board of Education, which "not only advocated
comprehensive reform but.., stated the following three goals of such
reform: equity, adequacy, and reliability of school funding." 80 The trial court
determined that several provisions of the Ohio's school funding scheme
violated the Ohio Constitution and ordered the "Superintendent of Public
Instruction and the State Board of Education to prepare legislative proposals
for submission to the General Assembly to eliminate wealth-based disparities
among Ohio's public school districts. ' 81 Although the State Board of
77 DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d 733, 735 (Ohio 1997). The predecessor of this suit was an
action brought by the Cincinnati City Board of Education in 1976 challenging the school
finance system under the Ohio state constitution. See Bd. of Educ. v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d
813 (Ohio 1979). In that case, the Ohio Supreme Court found no violation of the state
constitution based on the specific facts presented relating to the then-existing funding
scheme. Id. at 825. In 1989, the Coalition of Rural and Appalachian Schools conducted a
study of Ohio school finance which concluded that Ohio's system was inadequate and
inequitable. Public discussions of this study led to the organization of the Ohio Coalition
for Equity and Adequacy of School Funding in 1991. William L. Phillis, The Ohio
Experience: The School Funding Litigation Saga Continues On and On, at
http://www.ohiocoalition.org/PDFs/TheOhioExperience.pdf (last visited Sept. 2, 2002).
The Ohio Coalition for Equity and Adequacy filed the DeRolph lawsuit, naming
Youngstown City School District Board of Education, Mahoning County; the Lima City
School District Board of Education, Allen County; the Dawson-Bryant Local School
District Board of Education, Lawrence County; the Northern Local School District Board
of Education, Perry County; the Southern Local School District Board of Education,
Perry County; superintendents, members of the boards of education of these districts and
various teachers, students and next friends as plaintiffs. Id.; DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d at
734.
78 DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d at 734.
79 Id. The trial created more than five thousand six hundred pages of transcript and
four hundred and fifty exhibits. Witnesses for both the plaintiffs and defendants testified
to the inadequacies of Ohio's system of school funding and the need for reform. Id.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 735.
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Education voted not to appeal, the Attorney General filed notice of appeal. 82
The trial court was reversed by the Court of Appeals, 83 and the case came to
the Ohio Supreme Court on discretionary appeal.
84
In March 1997, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled in a four to three decision
that the State had not fulfilled its constitutionally mandated duty to provide
for a "thorough and efficient system of education." 85 The majority opinion
recited evidence showing that many children in Ohio attended schools in
decaying and unsafe buildings and lacked basic materials for learning.
86
Textbooks, paper, chalk, art supplies and even toilet paper were lacking or
were rationed in some districts.87 Schools in poor districts lacked library
facilities, food services facilities and access to computers and other
technologies. 88 High percentages of students in poor districts failed
proficiency tests and were not eligible to graduate from high school.
89
The court reviewed the system of funding that created great disparities
between wealthy and poor districts, noting several problems that left some
districts without sufficient funds. The court cited the State's reliance on a
residual budget funding approach, its reliance on local property taxes, the
requirement of school district borrowing, and lack of sufficient state funds
for construction and maintenance of buildings as particularly problematic.
90
The majority concluded that the State's statutory scheme was incapable of
achieving its constitutional purpose. 91 The court held 16 separate provisions
of the state code to be unconstitutional. 92 The school-financing scheme was
82 Id.
83 See DeRolph v. State, 1995 WL 557316 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 30, 1995). The
Court of Appeals concluded, in part, that any changes needed in the method of funding
public schools are properly a matter for the discretion of the legislative branch of the
government rather than the judicial branch. Id. at *5.
84 DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d at 735.
85 Id. at 736. Section 2, article VI of the Ohio Constitution provides: "The general
assembly shall make such provisions, by taxation, or otherwise, as, with the income
arising from the school trust fund, will secure a thorough and efficient system of common
schools throughout the state." OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2.
86 DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d at 743-46.
87 Id. at 744.
88 Id. at 743-46.
89 Id. at 744-45.
90 Id. at 747.
91 Id.
92 Id. (holding the following specific provisions to be unconstitutional: R.C. 133.301
(giving school districts authority to borrow money); R.C. 3313.483, 3313.487, 3313.488,
3313.489, and 3313.4810 (providing for emergency school assistance loans); R.C.
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unconstitutional and required a complete overhaul. 93
The court stayed the effect of the decision for a year to allow time for
new legislation to be enacted and remanded the case to the trial court with
directions to retain jurisdiction "until the legislation is enacted and in effect,
taking such action as may be necessary to ensure conformity with this
opinion."'94 The majority did not give the legislature specific directions on
how to correct the deficiencies of the funding scheme.95 It did, however,
"admonish the General Assembly that it must create an entirely new school
financing system" 96 and set forth several clear benchmarks for a
constitutionally adequate funding system.
First, the court made clear that the duty to fund schools falls on the
General Assembly, not on the local districts. Funding schools must be a high
budgetary priority; according to the court.97 "A thorough and efficient system
of common schools," the majority concluded, "includes facilities in good
repair and the supplies, materials, and funds necessary to maintain these
facilities in a safe manner, in compliance with all local, state, and federal
mandates." 98 The court identified four additional aspects of the school-
funding scheme that needed to be eliminated, specifically:
(1) the operation of the School Foundation Program, (2) the emphasis of
Ohio's school funding system on local property tax, (3) the requirement of
school district borrowing through the spending reserve and emergency
school assistance loan programs, and (4) the lack of sufficient funding in the
General Assembly's biennium budget for the construction and maintenance
of public school buildings. 99
A three-member minority of the court-comprised of Justices Moyer,
3317.01, 3317.02, 3317.022, 3317.023, 3317.024, 3317.04, 3317.05, 3317.051, and
3317.052 (The School Foundation Program); R.C. Chapter 3318 (The Classroom
Facilities Act)). The Classroom Facilities Act was held to be unconstitutional only to the
extent that it was underfunded.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id. ("Although we have found the school financing system to be unconstitutional,
we do not instruct the General Assembly as to the specifics of the legislation it should
enact.").
96 Id.





COURT-ORDERED MEDIATION IN SCHOOL FUNDING
Cook, and Lundberg Stratton-dissented, finding no constitutional violation
and arguing that the majority had exceeded its authority.' 00 "The issues of
the level and method of funding, and thereby the quality of the system,"
wrote Chief Justice Moyer, "are committed by the Constitution to the
collective will of the people through the legislative branch."'' Chief Justice
Moyer raised the specter of the long-lived school finance controversies in
New Jersey, Texas, California, and Connecticut.102 School finance litigation
in these states, he argued, demonstrates the "grim reality of a state supreme
court involving itself in setting minimum educational standards, which has
resulted in years of protracted litigation, ultimately placing the courts in the
position of determining state taxation methods, budgetary policies, and
educational policy."' 0 3 Although the dissenters did not endorse the status quo
in schools, they argued that the majority's decision violated the separation of
100 Id. at 782-95 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting).
101 Id. at 782.
102 Chief Justice Moyer included an extended list of citations to school finance cases
in these states to demonstrate the "troubled history of litigation that ensues when the
judiciary deems itself to be the ultimate authority in setting educational funding
mechanisms and standards." Id. at 786. Chief Justice Moyer included the following cases
as examples of the problem:
New Jersey: Robinson v. Cahill (1973), 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 ("Robinson I"),
followed by Robinson v. Cahill (1973), 63 N.J. 196, 306 A.2d 65 ("Robinson II");
Robinson v. Cahill (1975), 67 N.J. 35, 335 A.2d 6 ("Robinson III"); Robinson v.
Cahill (1975), 67 N.J. 333, 339 A.2d 193 ("Robinson IV"); Robinson v. Cahill
(1976), 69 N.J. 449, 355 A.2d 129 ("Robinson V"); Robinson v. Cahill (1976), 70
N.J. 155, 358 A.2d 457 ("Robinson VI"); Robinson v. Cahill (1976), 70 N.J. 464,
360 A.2d 400 ("Robinson VII"); Abbott v. Burke (1985), 100 N.J. 269, 495 A.2d
376 ("Abbott I"), followed by Abbott v. Burke (1990), 119 N.J. 287, 575 A.2d 359
("Abbott II"); Abbott v. Burke (1994), 136 N.J. 444, 643 A.2d 575 ("Abbott III");
Texas: Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby (Tex.1989), 777 S.W.2d 391
("Edgewood I"), followed by Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby (Tex.1991),
804 S.W.2d 491 ("Edgewood II"); Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. School Dist. v.
Edgewood Indep. School Dist. (Tex.1992), 826 S.W.2d 489 ("Edgewood III");
California: Serrano v. Priest (1971), 5 Cal.3d 584, 96 Cal.Rptr. 601, 487 P.2d 1241
("Serrano I"), followed by Serrano v. Priest (1977), 18 Cal.3d 728, 135 Cal.Rptr.
345, 557 P.2d 929 ("Serrano II"); Serrano v. Priest (Cal.App.1986), 226 Cal.Rptr.
584 ("Serrano III"); Butt v. State (1992), 4 Cal.4th 668, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 480, 842
P.2d 1240; Connecticut: Horton v. Meskill (1977), 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359
("Horton I"), followed by Horton v. Meskill (1982), 187 Conn. 187, 445 A.2d 579
("Horton II"); Horton v. Meskill (1985), 195 Conn. 24, 486 A.2d 1099 ("Horton
III"); Sheffv. O'Neill, (1996), 238 Conn. 1, 678 A.2d 1267.
Id. at 786.
103 Id. at 787.
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powers doctrine and decided a nonjusticiable question. 04
Following the 1997 Ohio Supreme Court decision, Governor George
Voinovich proposed a one-cent sales tax to raise money for schools. 10 5 This
measure died in the House; a similar measure was eventually submitted to
the voters and was defeated in May 1998.106 Meanwhile, the General
Assembly enacted several school reform provisions, including statutes
creating the Ohio School Facilities Commission, establishing school district
performance standards, and making appropriations for emergency repairs. 10 7
In November 1998, out-going Governor Voinovich hired Achieve, Inc.-a
group founded in 1996 by governors and business leaders and staffed by
conservative scholars-to provide the General Assembly, incoming
Governor Robert Taft, the new State Superintendent of Education, and state
legislators with "a candid assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of
Ohio's reform strategy."'10 8 The work of that group was on-going when the
time to report back to the trial judge, Judge Lewis, arrived.
In the summer of 1998, the plaintiffs returned to the trial court
maintaining that the General Assembly had failed to comply with the
mandate of the Supreme Court.10 9 The trial court agreed, and a second appeal
to the Ohio Supreme Court ensued."10 While awaiting hearing before the
Supreme Court, school-funding issues gained prominence in the General
Assembly. In June 1999 the recently elected Governor Taft signed into law
the state's first separate education budget."' In September 1999, Governor
Taft announced a 12-year plan to replace and renovate aging school
buildings."12 In March of 2000, the General Assembly allocated 2.5 billion
dollars from the state tobacco case settlement to pay for school construction
104 id. at 795.
105 School Funding Timeline, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Sept. 7, 2001, at 1 A.
106 DeRolph v. State, 712 N.E.2d 125, 145 (Ohio Com. P1. 1999).
107 S.B 102, 122nd Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Oh. 1997); S.B. 55, 122nd Gen.
Assem., Reg. Sess. (Oh. 1997); H.B. 650, 122nd Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Oh. 1997);
see also DeRolph, 712 N.E.2d at 144-59 (describing each new program and its
implementation through August 1998).
108 DeRolph II, 728 N.E.2d 993, 1001 n. I (Ohio 2000). Former Governor Voinovich
was a member of Achieve Inc.'s Board of Directors at the time the time the case came
before the Ohio Supreme Court. Id.
109 DeRolph, 712 N.E.2d at 125.
110 DeRolph II, 728 N.E.2d at 993.
I11 School Funding Timeline, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Sept. 7, 2001, at 10A.
112 Id.
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and repair. 1 3 Meanwhile, Achieve, Inc., the group appointed by the
Governor to study Ohio's schools, reported:
Ohio can be proud of a substantial set of policy initiatives it has launched in
the 1990s, and of the deepening investments it has made in educational
improvement. Since Fiscal Year 1991, state education funding has increased
by approximately 50 percent, twice the rate of inflation. The increase has
been greatest for low-wealth districts. Legislation already enacted
guarantees an additional 40 percent increase in state aid over the next five
years. 114
On May 11, 2000, in a second divided opinion-split along the same
lines as the DeRolph I decision-the Supreme Court reviewed the efforts of
the General Assembly and declared them to be insufficient to correct the
constitutional deficiencies of the school funding system. 115 The steps taken
by the General Assembly fell short of correcting the constitutional problems,
the majority opined, because it had not addressed the system's over-reliance
on local property taxes.11 6 Further, the General Assembly had not adjusted
the basic aid formula to reflect the amount actually needed to educate each
child; had not appropriated sufficient funds to repair and replace decrepit
school buildings; had enacted new unfunded mandates placing new
requirements on school districts; and had not corrected problems relating to
the calculation of revenue available from local property taxes. 117
The majority acknowledged the difficulty and complexity of revising the
funding scheme and carefully avoided telling the legislature what specific
new laws must be enacted. 1 18 It did, however, attempt to give substance to
the "thorough and efficient" standard, saying,
A thorough system means that each and every school district has
enough funds to operate. An efficient system is one in which each and every
113 S.B. 192, 123d Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2000); OHio REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 183.02(F), 183.26 (Anderson 2002).
114 DeRolph II, 728 N.E.2d at 1001.
115 Id. at 1020. ("We acknowledge the effort that has been made, and that a good
faith attempt to comply with the constitutional requirements has been mounted, but even
more is required.").
116 Id. at 1021. (Failure to address the problem of reliance on local property taxes
"will make it exceedingly difficult for any system of school funding to comply with the
Thorough and Efficient Clause, since the inherent inequities will remain.").
117 Id.
118 Id. at 1019-20.
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school district in the state has an ample number of teachers, sound buildings
that are in compliance with state fire and building codes, and equipment
sufficient for all students to be afforded an educational opportunity. 119
The court retained jurisdiction over the case, continuing it until June
2001 when the parties would return before the Supreme Court and a new
briefing schedule would be put in place. 120 The court declined to appoint a
special master to oversee the State's compliance with the court's order.1 21
Instead of relying on any court-allied process, the majority returned the
dispute to the political fray, saying,
We hope that partisan views will be put aside and that everyone will work
cooperatively for Ohio's children, as they are our future. The General
Assembly, in particular, must look beyond the political considerations
involved, and must provide Ohio's school children with a thorough and
efficient system of common schools, as the Ohio Constitution requires. 122
The court quoted the hopeful rhetoric of the Achieve, Inc. report: "This
may be a propitious moment to forge a new social compact between Ohio's
government policymakers and its education community."'123 As later events
would reveal, the moment was not as propitious as it then appeared to be.
Following the May 2000 ruling, action on the Supreme Court's mandate
appeared to stall in the General Assembly. The joint legislative committee
that was formed to recommend funding changes met only a few times. 124
Meanwhile the Ohio Chamber of Commerce backed a multi-million dollar
campaign to defeat Justice Alice Robie Resnick, the author of the DeRolph 11
majority decision, in her campaign for reelection.' 25 State budget cuts were
predicted. Following the landslide reelection of Justice Resnick, however, the
Ohio General Assembly once again embarked on a legislative tour through
the school funding provisions, making a series of revisions and new
appropriations. With only one month left before the scheduled argument
119 Id. at 1001.
120 Id. at 1022.
121 The Court's decision not to appoint a special master appears without comment or
analysis. Id.
122 Id. at 1021.
123 Id. at 1022.
124 Catherine Candisky & Lee Leonard, School Funding Plan Won't Fit State
Budget, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Nov. 12, 2000, at Al.
125 Emily Heller & Mark Ballard, Hard-Fought, Big-Money Judicial Races: US.
Chamber of Commerce Enters Fray with Ad Money, NAT. L. J., Nov. 6, 2000, at Al.
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before the Supreme Court, the General Assembly passed a biennium budget
that included changes in the school funding formula.126 By now, however,
the economy had begun to sour. "State sales tax revenue in .the July through
October period fell $80 million short of estimates." 127 Rather than raise
additional tax revenue to cover the additional school expenditures, however,
Governor Taft and the legislature cut budgets of other. government offices
and agencies. 128:
When the case reappeared on the Supreme Court docket in the summer
of 2001, however, plaintiffs were adamant that the State had failed to follow
the mandate of DeRolph I and DeRolph H. The State had not corrected the
over-reliance on local property taxes, had put in place what plaintiffs alleged
to be a faulty formula for calculating state aid, and had failed to address
various factors that put revenue pressure on local school districts. 129
Defendants maintained that its legislative effort to improve schools was
producing greatly increased revenue for schools and improving quality and
standards of performance. State per pupil allocations had been increased; a
12-year, $23 billion plan to repair and replace old schools was in place;
special allocations called "parity aid" would now give additional funds to
poorer districts; and new proficiency tests had been devised. 130
The Ohio Supreme Court found itself in a difficult position as it set out to
make its third decision on the constitutionality of the school funding
scheme. 131 Four years after its bold decision declaring the funding system to
be unconstitutional, state budget allocations for schools had increased, but
the "complete overhaul" that was directed in the 1997 decision had not taken
place. Political and media pressure on the court had become intense. The
126 School Funding Timeline, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Sept. 7, 2001, at 1 OA.
127 Back to School, CRAIN'S CLEVELAND Bus., Nov. 27, 2000, at 10.
128 DeRolph III, 754 N.E.2d 1184, 1242 (Ohio 2001) (Sweeney, J., dissenting).
129 See William Hershey, School Funding Flaws Fixed, DAYTON DAILY NEWS,
June 19, 2001, at IA.
Forces putting revenue pressure on local districts included business tax abatements,
inventory tax phase-out (Am. Sub. H.B. 283, 123d Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2000)),
and the tax reduction factors that prohibit districts from realizing increased revenue as a
result of appreciation of local property values. Am. Sub H.B. 920, 11 th Gen. Assem.,
Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1976).
130 DeRolph III, 754 N.E.2d at 1191-98.
131 The case had produced "three signed majority opinions, a per curiam opinion,
eleven separate concurrences and dissents, and a number of rulings on motions filed by
plaintiffs and defendants. "Id. at 1188.
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court was widely blamed for budget cuts in popular state programs. 132 The
General Assembly seemed incapable of making the structural changes in the
system envisioned in DeRolph I and II, and the task of overseeing
incremental revisions-tinkering toward a constitutional funding system-
appeared endless. Further, if the court held the current scheme to be
unconstitutional, it seemed likely that $1.4 billion in additional budget
allocations for education-already calculated in local school budgets-would
"be reallocated to the other state institutions and programs so severely cut to
accommodate the school funding plan."' 133 Three of the justices had
consistently opposed the Supreme Court's involvement in school funding
issues. Now, for two members of the original majority-Justice Douglas and
Justice Pfeifer-finding some way to end the Supreme Court's involvement
in school funding seemed to be central.134
The DeRolph III135 decision issued on September 6, 2001, was a self-
proclaimed compromise. 136 Chief Justice Moyer, who had dissented from the
majority opinions in both DeRolph I and DeRolph II, wrote for a three-
member plurality that included justices Douglas and Pfeifer, members of the
previous majorities. Justice Lundberg Stratton, formerly a member of the
dissenting minority, filed a short opinion, concurring in the judgment only.
Thus, the DeRolph III majority consisted of two members of the previous
majority and two members of the previous minority. Chief Justice Moyer
began by describing the differences of opinion existing among the justices on
the court. Invoking the wisdom of Thomas Jefferson, however, he opined
that the time had come to sacrifice individually held opinions for the sake of
harmony. 137 "None of us," he admitted, "is completely comfortable with the
decision we announce in this opinion."' 138 He wrote,
A climate of legal, financial, and political uncertainty concerning Ohio's
school-funding system has prevailed at least since this court accepted
132 Programs cut to accommodate the school funding plan included, inter alia, higher
education, mental health, protection of battered women, and prison security. Id. at 1210
(Douglas, J., concurring).
133 Id.
134 Id. at 1214 ("[lIt is the primary mission of this court to accept cases that properly
invoke its jurisdiction under the Constitution, read briefs and hear arguments on those
cases, decide the cases and then publish opinions... [and] any other combination of
votes short of a majority of four would not be meeting our constitutional obligations.").
135 Id. at 1184.
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jurisdiction of the case. We have concluded that no one is served by
continued uncertainty and fractious debate. In that spirit, we have created,
the consensus that should terminate the role of the court in this dispute. 139
Chief Justice Moyer went on to undertake a detailed review of the
revised state law provisions for funding public schooling, noting changes
relating to the calculation of the base per student allocation, 140 the addition of
"parity aid" for poorer districts, 141 new programs to improve school
facilities, 142 new academic standards, 143 and measures reducing the disparity
in funding produced by funding schools through local property taxes. 144
These measures, taken together, said Moyer, demonstrated a commitment by
the legislature and the governor to improve public education in Ohio. 145 The
school-funding scheme, as it was presented to the court, required only two
changes to meet constitutional scrutiny. With a change in the method of
calculating the basic cost of an adequate education and full funding for the
parity aid program, the state's school-funding program could be
constitutionally implemented, Moyer concluded. 146 These changes would
require additional funding, but would not require a new legislative
scheme. 147
Chief Justice Moyer's opinion pulled together a fragile agreement among
four justices, grounded more in policy and practical reasoning than in legal
principle. Justice Lundberg Stratton, who provided the fourth vote for the
majority, stated in her short concurrence that her opinion on the merits had
not changed, but that she joined the majority as "a pragmatic compromise to
resolve an impasse that I believe has been divisive for too long and for which
the alternatives proposed by the dissents are truly unacceptable."'' 48
139 Id. at 1190.
140 Id. at 1191-92.
141 Id. at 1193.
142 Id. at 1193-95.
143 Idat 1196-97.
144 Id. at 1198-1200.
145 Id. at 1200.
146 Id. at 1200-01. The method used by the state to calculate the per student cost of
an adequate education had eliminated the top-spending districts from the equation. Chief
Justice Moyer held that the "wealth screen" method of calculation resulted in a distorted
picture of the amount actually needed to educate each child. Eliminating the wealth
screen would require new calculations and new fiscal appropriations, but would not
fundamentally alter the funding scheme. Id. at 1200.
14 7 Id. at 1201.
148 Id. at 1216 (Stratton, J., concurring).
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The opinions of the justices in the plurality reflect a strong desire to
reach a resolution in a particularly difficult and divisive case. The justices
considered a wide variety of remedial options, 149 but did not discuss the
possibility of appointing a mediator to assist the parties in resolving the
dispute for themselves. Justice Douglas briefly entertained the option of
appointing a special master or blue ribbon commission to oversee the
remedial process, but rejected the idea without analysis, saying, only "[t]here
were never four votes for this approach."' 150
As conciliatory and tentative as is the tone of the plurality opinions, so
are the dissents vehement. In strongly worded dissents, Justices Sweeney and
Resnick, who were members of the majority in DeRolph I and II, detailed the
continuing deficiencies of the state's funding scheme and criticized the
majority for abandoning the principles enunciated in the previous two
DeRolph decision.151 "The majority," wrote Justice Resnick, "places entirely
too much importance on political expedience and not nearly enough on
justice."'152 Justice Cook, taking a position on the ideological opposite end
from justices Resnick and Sweeney, argued in her dissent that the decision of
the majority illustrated the reasons why the court never should have become
involved in school funding issues in the first place. 153 The issues are
necessarily questions of policy and should be left in the hands of the
legislature. "The judicial oath of office," she declared, "requires me to
support the Ohio Constitution and to perform the duties of a judge-not of a
legislator." 54
Almost before the Supreme Court photocopy machines were cool, the
authority of the fragile four-member majority opinion came into question.
Plaintiffs had based their arguments on incorrect numbers, howled state
officials. 155 If the state were to implement the changes in the method of
calculating the per student base cost as required by DeRolph III, the
increased cost to the state would far exceed the amount contemplated by the
court. Instead of $400 million, the changes required in DeRolph III would
cost an additional $1.2 billion. 156
The court had been the subject of controversy before the DeRolph III
149 Id. at 1209-12 (Douglas, J. concurring).
150 Id. at 1211.
151 Id. at 1223-35 (Resnick, J., dissenting); Id. at 1241-44 (Sweeney, J., dissenting).
152 Id. at 1241. (Resnick, J., dissenting).
153 Id. at 1245-46 (Cook, J., dissenting).
15 4 Id. at 1247.
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decision; now the justices became the targets of public derision. One editorial
in the Plain Dealer denounced the decision as follows:
The justices' unprincipled dash toward consensus on school funding
resulted not in praise for their statesmanship or admiration for their
ingenuity, but in deserved diatribes against their inconsistent, illogical
reasoning. And, in what stands as perhaps the sweetest sort of justice, it
now looks as though the court's majority didn't even understand what it
did.157
Indeed, the majority had based its assumptions on numbers that were
incorrect. 158 The changes required by DeRolph III would be much more
expensive than the majority had anticipated and might throw the entire state
budget process into disarray. The court granted the state's motion to
reconsider and, in a move that was widely perceived to be a "punt," 159
referred the parties to mediation. 160
IV. THE FAILURE OF THE DEROLPH MEDIATION
A few short months after the DeRolph case was referred to mediation,
the mediator reported back to the court that the parties were unable to reach a
resolution. 161 The newspapers proclaimed that the mediation was a
"doomed" effort from its inception and its failure was a "foregone
conclusion."' 162 The position of Justice Resnick, who had opposed referring
the case to mediation, appeared to be vindicated. "Today the parties on each
side are firmly entrenched in their positions," Justice Resnick had written.163
And "the oral arguments before us in this matter made it clear that mediation
is an impractical solution."' 164 Indeed, the uncompromising tone of the
157 Chris Sheridan, Justices Drop Their Dignity and Run, PLAIN DEALER, Sept. 9,
2001, at H3.
158 DeRolph Mediation, 758 N.E.2d at 1120 (Douglas, J., concurring). The majority
had based its assumptions on inaccurate numbers that the state had provided to the
plaintiffs.
159 Editorial, The Court Punts Again, CINCINNATI POST, Nov. 21, 2001, at 16A.
160 DeRolph Mediation, 758 N.E.2d at 1114.
161 Howard Bellman, Master Commissioner's Final Report, at
http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/derolph/bellman3-2 I.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2002).
162 Editorial, The Last Word, COLUMBus DISPATCH, March 24, 2002, at D2.
163 DeRolph Mediation, 758 N.E.2d at 1122 (Resnick, J., dissenting).
164 Id. at 1123 (quoting Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 725 A.2d 648, 651 (N.H.
1998)).
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arguments presented by the parties combined with the longevity and
complexity of the dispute might seem to dim the realistic prospects of
achieving a mediated resolution, making the mediation requirement nothing
more than an expensive additional layer of process. 165 But neither the strident
tone of appellate oral arguments nor the number of years of inability to
resolve their differences provides an accurate predictor of success in
mediation. 166
While there may be many reasons why the attempt to resolve the
DeRolph litigation through mediation failed, 167 I will focus on two matters
that are highly determinative of success in any mediation, but that merit
special attention in institutional reform litigation: (1) participant motivation,
and (2) the identification and involvement of appropriate stakeholders. I will
suggest that the best possibility for reaching a mediated resolution in a school
165 The costs of mediation in the DeRolph case can be measured concretely in terms
of money and time. The monetary costs include $67,746 billed by the mediator, and the
attorneys' fees to pay for the parties' preparation and participation in the mediation
process. See DeRolph v. State, 766 N.E.2d 994 (Ohio 2002); DeRolph v. State, 768
N.E.2d 658 (Ohio 2002). The time cost of the attempted mediation amounts to roughly
six months delay in a decision by the Ohio Supreme Court on the merits of the motion to
reconsider. Of course, the time "cost" may be interpreted as a true detriment to the
plaintiffs, who await implementation of a remedy in the case, but as a benefit to the
defendants, who seek to avoid a judicially imposed remedy. In cases where one party
uses mediation to delay the settlement of the case, mediation can potentially add one
more layer to a process that will eventually end up back in court. LAVINIA HALL,
NEGOTIATION: STRATEGIES FOR MUTUAL GAIN 57 (1993). These "costs" may seem fairly
trivial in the scope of a case with an eleven-year history in litigation. Nevertheless, the
law should not require a useless act. See, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 74 (1980)
("The law does not require the doing of a futile act."). If requiring mediation serves only
to delay resolution, then court-ordered mediation cannot be justified.
166 Mori Irvine, Better Late Than Never. Settlement at the Federal Court ofAppeals,
I J. App. PRAC. & PROCESS 341, 342-46 (1999) (discussing reasons why "the most
difficult, most intractable" cases may reach resolution when pending before the U.S.
Court of Appeals).
167 The success of any mediation may be affected by highly particular factors such
as the personalities and negotiating skills of the participants or the skill of the mediator.
Because these factors do not lend themselves to generalization, they will not be discussed
here at any length. I should mention, however, that the mediator who was appointed in
this case, Howard S. Bellman, is a highly respected and eminently well-qualified
mediator who has extensive experience in mediating environmental policy issues, labor
contracts, and school disputes. It seems unlikely that the Court could have found any
person who would have been better prepared than Mr. Bellman for the task of facilitating
settlement in this case. For a list of the full qualifications of Mr. Bellman, see Howard S.
Bellman, at Resume, http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/derolph/bellman-resume.pdf (last
visited on September 13, 2002).
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funding case-and perhaps in other institutional reform litigation - might
be achieved in a process that resembles a public policy facilitation, but that
remains closely tied to the court, with the accompanying prospect of court
intervention for remediation and resolution. Such a process would require a
clear and unequivocal statement by the court declaring the rights of the
parties and remedial principles, incentives to permit participation by a broad
range of non-litigant stakeholders, a generous time frame, and a team of
highly skilled mediators.
A. Motivation to Settle
Mediation is a facilitated negotiation that depends for its success, to a
large extent, on the motivation of the parties. None of the potential benefits
of mediation may be realized unless the participants are motivated to resolve
the dispute. 168 Even when mediation is court-ordered, its goal is voluntary
settlement. The court may compel attendance, but not resolution. 169 Thus,
mediation is driven by the professional, practical, and personal goals and
motivations of the participants. 170 Parties in a case that has been litigated
168 For a discussion of the potential benefits of mediation, see supra Part
II.B.
169 The authority of the Supreme Court of Ohio to order the parties to attend
mediation is found in OHIO SUP. CT. R. 14(6), which provides as follows:
Settlement Conferences
(A) Referral of cases for settlement conferences
The Supreme Court may, sua sponte or on motion by a party, refer to a master
commissioner for a settlement conference any case that originated in the court of
appeals, any appeal from an administrative agency, any original action, or any non-
felony case that the Supreme Court deems appropriate. The master commissioner
may conduct the settlement conference in person or by telephone. At the settlement
conference, the parties shall explore settling the case, simplifying the issues, and
expediting the procedure, and may consider any other matter that might aid in
resolving the case.
(B) Attendance
If a case is referred for a settlement conference, each party to the case, or the
representative of each party who has full settlement authority, and the attorney for
each party shall attend the conference, unless excused, in writing, by the master
commissioner to whom the case has been referred. If a party or an attorney fails to
attend the conference without being excused, the Supreme Court may assess the
party or the attorney reasonable expenses caused by the failure, including reasonable
attorney fees or all or a part of the expenses of the other party. The Supreme Court
may also dismiss the action, strike documents filed by the offending party, or
impose any other appropriate penalty.
170 Irvine, supra note 166, at 346.
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through judgment and appeal, or, as in this case, through several judgments
and several appeals, may have considerable resistance to settlement. 171
Without significant motivational incentives for settlement, parties are
unlikely to set aside strongly held positions. Experience in appellate
mediation has demonstrated, however, that despite the hardening of positions
that occurs in prolonged litigation, parties frequently have strong motivation
to settle a case pending on appeal. 172 In even the most long-lived and
seemingly intractable disputes, the parties may be moved to settle by a
variety of factors including, (1) a professional assessment of the risks of an
unfavorable decision by the court; (2) the cost of continued litigation; (3) the
need for immediate relief; (4) the possibility of achieving a flexible or
creative result that might not be available by court-order; and (5) the desire to
reach a fair resolution of the problem. 173 The common thread in the first
three factors just mentioned is some identifiable risk of continuing to litigate
or an identifiable benefit of immediate settlement. Without some risk
inherent in the legal process (or in the delay involved in using the process)
and aversion to that risk, 174 it may be difficult to generate motivation to
settle.
1. The Court's Role in Defining the Risk of Non-Settlement
Generally, incentives to settle operate in institutional reform litigation as
they would in any litigation. 175 The court must, however, deliver the case to
mediation with the incentives to settle intact. This is particularly true in a
171 Thomas F. Ball, Ill, Appellate Mediation in the Fourth Circuit: An Idea that
Works, S.C. LAw., Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 29-30 (explaining that mediating appeals is made
more difficult by strong, indignant feelings on one side and the "glow of victory" on the
other).
172 Irvine, supra note 166, at 345-46.
173 Ball, supra note 171, at 30-31 (listing fourteen factors that prompt appellate
settlements).
174 Howard Bellman points out that what is perceived as a "risk" to one person may
not be a risk to another. He cites the example from the tale, "The Tar Baby." See JOEL
CHANDLER HARRIs, BRER RABBIT (1978). In "The Tar Baby" Brer Fox captures Brer
Rabbit and prepares to cook him up in a stew. Brer Rabbit feigns relief that he will be
eaten-rather than subjected to a worse punishment. He begs Brer Fox not to throw him
into the briar patch. Brer Fox, wanting to cause Brer Rabbit the maximum pain, throws
Brer Rabbit into the briar patch. Brer Rabbit dances away, saying "I was bred and born in
the briar patch!"
175 See generally Schlanger, supra note 10 (discussing incentives for settlement in
prison reform litigation).
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mandatory, court-ordered mediation. When it is necessary to order parties to
attempt to resolve the dispute through mediation, it can be assumed that-
without the order to mediate-the barriers to effective negotiation and
settlement are higher than the parties' pre-existing motivation to settle. In
mandatory mediation, it is the power of the court and the identified legal
framework for decision that creates an impetus for settlement and, to some
extent, sustains the parties' motivation to negotiate. 17 6 The court plays a
major role not only in creating the forum and structuring the process, but also
in defining the risk of non-settlement.' 77
The risk of non-settlement is defined in large part by the prospect of
continued court action. The credible threat that the court will, in fact, take
action if a settlement is not reached plays an essential role in motivating the
parties to move toward resolution. In an ordinary private civil action, this is
generally taken for granted. The parties know as they begin a court-ordered
mediation that if no settlement is reached, the court will decide the case for
them. Judgment will be entered and executed. In a case where the court has
found that one party has violated the rights or property of the other, the
litigants may properly expect that the party whose rights or property were
violated will be vindicated and the wrongdoer will have to pay. 178 The
parties may assume that the court will impose a remedy that is not of the
wrongdoer's own choosing. In a school funding case, however, these
assumptions do not necessarily apply.
After finding constitutional violations in cases challenging school
funding, state courts have frequently deferred to the legislature or executive
176 Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99
HARV. L. REv. 668, 682 (1986) (observing that the option to resort to court adjudication
provides essential motivation for cooperation in the process: "It is only because
handicapped children have a statutory right to education that parent-school mediation is
successful. It is only because tenants have procedural rights that landlords will bargain
at all.").
177 Another way that negotiation theorists describe the dynamics surrounding the
"risk of non-settlement" uses the term "BATNA" or "Best Alternative to a Negotiated
Agreement." See generally ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES:
NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 101-11 (1981). If the BATNA compares
negatively to the proposal offered in negotiation, there will be an incentive to accept the
offered proposal. How parties conceive their BATNAs relates to their individual
perception of risk and their risk aversion. See LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & JEFFREY
CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE 81-85 (1987).
178 This is, of course, a dramatic simplification of the complex calculus that may
inform the thinking of litigants entering mediation. For an expanded list of factors
affecting motivation to settle appeals, see Ball, supra note 171, at 30-31.
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to fashion a remedy. 179 Rather than impose a remedy of its own making, a
state court dealing with a school funding case is likely to put the task of
designing a remedy back in the hands of the defendant, the rights-violating
party. 180 Even where the legislature has repeatedly failed to implement a
remedy that satisfactorily addresses the identified constitutional violations,
courts have left the task of formulating a remedy in the hands of the
legislature. 181 If the participants representing the legislature can anticipate
that the legislature will be allowed to choose its own remedy following an
unsuccessful mediation, they may perceive no risk inherent in failing. 182 It
hardly needs to be pointed out that, "[n]o group should choose to be part of a
negotiation if what it can obtain 'away from the bargaining table' is better
than what it is likely to get by negotiating." 183 The court's deference to the
legislature on the issue of remedy has the effect of taking the wind out of the
motivational sails of the mediation process. 184
179 Yudof, supra note 39, at 587; Michael A. Rebell & Robert L. Hughes, Efficacy
and Engagement: The Remedies Problem Posed by Sheff v. O'Neill-and a Proposed
Solution, 29 CoNN. L. REv. 1115, 1134 (1997).
180 Professor Wendy Parker points out that the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in a
related area of litigation, school desegregation cases, have created a similar phenomenon.
In school desegregation cases, she argues, the court's remedial "ambiguity allowed
defendants to ... define the desired end result and, to a certain extent, the plaintiffs'
rights themselves." Wendy Parker, The Supreme Court and Public Law Remedies: A Tale
of Two Kansas Cities, 50 HASTINGS L. J. 475, 480 (1999).
181 Here, I mean only to describe an approach frequently taken by state courts. See,
e.g., DeRolph II, 728 N.E.2d 993, 1021 (Ohio 2000) (holding that the General Assembly
had not adequately addressed the constitutional violations identified in DeRolph I, 677
N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997), but deciding that "the best course of action is to provide the
defendants more time to comply.. ."); see also Abbott I, 495 A.2d 376, 394 (N.J. 1985),
followed by Abbott II, 575 A.2d 359, 408 (N.J. 1990); Abbott III, 643 A.2d 575, 579
(N.J. 1994) (repeatedly returning school funding case to the legislature for remediation). I
do not mean to suggest that repeated deferral to the legislature or executive is legally
required or desirable.
182 A legislative participant in a failed school funding mediation might reasonably
expect to be thrown like Brer Rabbit back into the briar patch, which, for the legislator,
would be the General Assembly. See generally HARRIS, supra note 174.
183 SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, supra note 177, at 81.
184 The continued involvement of the courts in the process of devising and
implementing a remedy is crucial to the success of the mediation process. Experience has
demonstrated time and again that repeatedly returning a school finance case to the
legislature for the formulation of a remedy is unsatisfactory. See Rebell & Hughes, supra
note 179, at 1146. DeRolph itself stands as a prime example. Other examples of
legislative inefficacy in fashioning a remedy include Abbott, Sheff and others. See, e.g.,
cases cited by Chief Justice Moyer, supra, note 102.
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Courts defer the remedial process to the legislature in school finance
cases for a number of theoretical and practical reasons related to the
judiciary's own power, legitimacy, and competency. 185 It is beyond the scope
of this article to undertake a full discussion of the separation of powers and
political question doctrines that underlie judicial deference to the legislature
in school finance cases. 186 Nevertheless, the prospects for successful
mediation are dimmed unless the court expresses the determination to take
hold of the remedial reigns if the mediation process fails. In other words, if
the court wants the mediation process to be successful, it should send the
parties to mediation with clear forewarning that it will not continue to defer
to the legislature for resolution if the process fails.
Moreover, the court should refer the case to a mediation process early in
the remedial phase of the litigation, before resentment has built up in the
legislature and before the parties might infer from the court's actions an
unwillingness or inability to act decisively if legislative action does not
satisfy constitutional requirements. In the Ohio school finance litigation, the
order referring the parties to mediation came when the litigation was more
than a decade old, and after the Supreme Court had given the legislature an
opportunity to cure constitutional deficiencies-not once, but twice. 187 By
185 See supra text accompanying notes 38-63.
186 The goal of this paper is to explore whether and how mediation might be useful
in resolving school funding cases. It does not attempt to analyze the separation of powers
and political question doctrine, but instead assumes that the judiciary has the power to act
in this arena. For argument supporting the exercise of judicial power in school finance
cases, see Blanchard, supra note 59. Mr. Blanchard argues that state courts have strained
to abdicate their authority over education finance under the aegis of the separation of
powers and political question doctrines, which are federal doctrines that are not freely
transferable to state constitutional analysis. Id. at 246-49. He further argues that local
control in school matters is a policy choice rather than a matter of state constitutional
requirement and that the dangers of the tyranny of the majority are far more critical at the
state level. Therefore, he asserts that state courts should exercise vigorous protection of
individual rights under revitalized state constitutions. Id. See also, Robert A. Schapiro,
Contingency and Universalism in State Separation of Powers Discourse, 4 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 79 (1998) (arguing that federal separation of powers analysis is ill-
suited to state constitutional systems). Contrary argument may be found in David J.
Owsiany, The General Assembly v. the Supreme Court: Who Makes Public Policy in
Ohio?, 32 U. TOL. L. REV. 549 (2001) (judicial action in school finance cases amounts to
usurpation of legislative policy-making authority).
187 See generally DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997) (returning the matter to
the legislature for action); DeRolph II, 728 N.E.2d 993 (Ohio 2000) (returning the matter
to the legislature a second time); DeRolph Mediation, 758 N.E.2d 1113 (Ohio 2001)
(referring the case to mediation).
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the time mediation was ordered, legislative resentment of the court's actions
was palpable. Justice Douglas expressed his concern in DeRolph III:
[T]oday we live in different times. We hear from certain members of the
General Assembly that we can say whatever we want but those
pronouncements will be ignored. We hear some members of the General
Assembly saying that impeachment of one or more justices might be in
order and, in fact, we have one self-proclaimed constitutional law expert, a
professor, advocating our impeachment or removal from office and stating
that the General Assembly has a duty to ignore court orders .... 188
An ideal mediation order in a school finance case would come early in
the remedial phase of the litigation-perhaps after the court has given the
legislature one opportunity to enact constitutional school funding legislation
without further court action 189-and would outline the procedures for
resolution that the court will follow if the mediation effort is unsuccessful.
The practice of setting forth' the steps that will follow an unsuccessful
mediation is already common in cases referred to mediation or to special
masters in the federal court. 190 Such an order would support the parties'
188 DeRolph III, 754 N.E.2d 1184, 1211 (Ohio 2001). The professor Justice Douglas
refers to is undoubtedly Washington University School of Law Professor David J.
Owsiany, who published an article that criticizes the justices' decisions in school funding
and tort reform cases. Professor Owsiany writes,
[T]he court engaged in brazen lawmaking and, in the process, usurped
policymaking authority from the legislative and executive branches .... By acting
to assert itself either by removing overreaching justices, ignoring the court's attempt
to make policy, or introducing a constitutional amendment reaffirming the
separation of powers, the legislature would be fulfilling its duty to resist judicial
usurpation of legislative authority.
Owsiany, supra note 186, at 561.
189 The possibility that the legislature might take steps to cure constitutional
deficiencies without further court action should not be discounted or ignored. In
Vermont, the state legislature enacted a far-reaching school finance reform package just
four months after the Vermont Supreme Court declared that the state's education finance
system violated the state constitution. See Michael A. Rebell & Jeffrey Metzler, Rapid
Response, Radical Reform: The Story of School Finance Litigation in Vermont, 31 J.L. &
EDUC. 167, 167 (2002).
190 See, e.g., Vaughn G. v. Mayor of Baltimore, No. MJG-84-1911 (D.Md. Nov. 1,
1999) (setting forth detailed procedures for court determination of issues not resolved by
the court-ordered mediation) (copy on file with the author). For an extended discussion of
federal court practice in drawing the terms of orders appointing special masters, see
James S. DeGraw, Rule 53, Inherent Powers, and Institutional Reform: The Lack of
Limits on Special Masters, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 800 (1991). The language of the Ohio
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motivation to participate by giving a clear picture of the remedial alternative
that would be set in motion if the parties fail to reach a resolution of their
own devising. For example, the court could decide in advance of the
mediation that, in case of failure of the mediation, it would appoint an
independent, five-member blue-ribbon commission. 191 Specific details could
be included. For example, the court could announce that the commission
would be composed of members with expertise in law, finance, taxation,
education and labor relations and would develop a specific legislative
proposal to meet the state's constitutional requirements relating to school
funding; and that the court would submit the commission's proposal to the
legislature, following approval by the court, with an accompanying order to
enact it.192 In its order setting up the mediation, the court could also
demonstrate its commitment to an effective remedy by outlining sanctions
that would be imposed if the legislature failed to enact the legislation
formulated by the blue-ribbon commission. These sanctions might include
escalating fines on the legislative body, or, perhaps, an order enjoining the
collection of taxes pending favorable legislative action. 193
Supreme Court Practice Rule that provides the authority for requiring settlement
conferences and the appointment of a special master or mediator is similarly broad and
contains no restrictions that would prevent the court from providing a procedural
roadmap. See OHIO SuP. CT. PRAC. R. XIV(6).
191 Justice Douglas considered this option in DeRolph III, but stated that there were
only three justices who supported the idea. DeRolph III, 754 N.E.2d at 1211.
192 Id.
193 According to Professor Sturm, the authority of the court to exercise "coercive
power to eliminate ongoing public law violations rests on a solid jurisprudential
foundation." Sturm, supra note 8, at 1378. "The legitimacy of these techniques derives
from the widely accepted principle that rights should find vindication in an effective
remedy." Id. at 1379. The power of the court to coerce compliance with its orders through
the use of its contempt power, including the use of fines, injunctions, or confinement, is
inherent in the court and not subject to legislative control. See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v.
Cincinnati Dist. Council, 299 N.E.2d 686 (Ohio 1973). Further, the inherent power of the
courts, both state and federal, to effectuate a remedy that protects the constitutional rights
of the parties generally includes the power to require a taxing authority to levy taxes. See,
e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 57 (1990) ("[A] local government with taxing
authority may be ordered to levy taxes in excess of the limit set by state statute where
there is reason based in the Constitution for not observing the statutory limitation.").
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2. The Court's Role in Creating A Substantive Framework For
Resolution
If the mediation order in -the Ohio school finance litigation had come
earlier in the litigation 194 and had set forth a fall-back remedial procedure, it
would have delivered the matter to the mediator with better prospects for
generating motivation to settle than did the mediation order that was entered
in 2001.195 Better timing and a fall-back procedure alone, however, are not
the only factors affecting party motivation that are within the court's sphere
of influence and responsibility. A court order referring a case to mediation
ought to create a substantive remedial framework that is neither too specific
nor too general-a substantive framework that allows and encourages the
participants to find their own resolutions to the difficult issues raised in
school finance cases. The framework for decision should provide the
normative parameters for resolution and at the same time leave room for
creative problem solving. Professor Sturm points out, "[a]lthough these
normative parameters do not provide the basis for selecting among the
remedial alternatives designed to realize the liability norm, they do define the
remediation norm as both the driving force and constraint of the deliberative
process."196
In referring a case to mandatory mediation, the court's task is to walk a
tight-rope. It ought to define the risk of non-settlement and remedial norms,
but leave options open to permit the parties flexibility in choosing a
resolution that meets their needs and interests. The court must give sufficient
guidance, but leave a realm of ambiguity to motivate the parties to formulate
a remedy of their own.
The mediation process is not the appropriate forum for the formulation of
the substantive liability norms or the basic remedial norms. Professor
Lawrence Susskind, a well-known scholar of alternative dispute resolution
processes, makes a distinction "between disputes about rights (whether or not
something ought to be done) and disputes about how to do something, given
that there is agreement that it ought to be done. Consensus building
processes," he says, "can be used to help with the second type of dispute but
194 As noted above, a logical time to send the case to mediation might have been
after the legislature's first failed attempt to enact remedies to cure constitutional
violations. See generally DeRolph II, 728 N.E.2d. 993 (Ohio 2000).
195 DeRolph Mediation, 758 N.E.2d 1113, 1116 (Ohio 2001).
196 Sturm, supra note 8, at 1429.
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not the first." 197 The power and authority to declare the constitutional rights
of the parties is properly the task of the court, as the "articulator[] and
guardian[]of constitutional values."'198 Particularly in cases involving the
ideals of equal justice, the court must play an important role that a consensus
building process cannot. As Professor Richard Abel points out, "[l]aw is the
sole arena within which unequals can hope to achieve justice. Only equals
can risk a confrontation within the informal processes of the economy and
the polity."'199
Left to their own devices, legislatures and executive agencies, even if they
acknowledge the existence of inequities or inadequacies, are not likely to
provide meaningful relief, since they tend to be answerable politically to the
established power interests that benefit from the status quo. Thus, once a
constitutional value has been identified, it is the courts that must initiate and
sustain an effective colloquy. In doing so, the courts should provide the
legislative and executive branches with clear guidelines on expected
directions and a workable framework for organizing and monitoring the
results .... 200
Within the context of a consensus building process, a well-articulated
statement of rights and remedial principles acts to counterbalance the power
of the parties representing the status quo, placing the parties on more closely
equal footing. It establishes a framework for discussion without
inappropriately attempting to decide the details of implementation. 20 1 It
empowers the parties to devise their own resolution, and, with the continued
participation of the court in the process, serves to motivate them to move
toward resolution.
197 Lawrence Susskind, Resolving Public Disputes, in NEGOTIATION: STRATEGIES
FOR MUTUAL GAIN 61, 66 (Lavina Hall ed. 1993). But see Rebell & Hughes, supra note
11, at 124.
198 Rebell & Hughes, supra note 179, at 1152.
199 GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 68, at 175 (quoting Richard Abel, Informalism: A
Tactical Equivalent to Law, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 375, 383 (1985)). But see Freeman
& Langbein, supra note 70, at 10814 (smaller, less powerful groups participating in
negotiation of environmental regulations did not find that larger, more powerful groups
enjoyed disparate influence over outcomes).
200 Rebell & Hughes, supra note 179, at 1146-47.
201 In addition to providing a favorable context for creative problem solving, an
order that allows the participants to devise the remedial details would capitalize on the
unique competencies of the participants and accommodate, to some degree, for separation
of powers concerns.
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In the DeRolph case, the mediation was required to go forward in the
absence of a clear statement of rights and remedial principles. The court had
issued opinions in March 1997 and in May of 2000, either of which would
have served as a sufficient guiding document for a mediation process. 20 2 In
its 1997 opinion, the court held the state's statutory school finance scheme to
be unconstitutional, identified aspects of the school funding scheme that
required change, and established benchmarks for any new funding scheme
that might be devised.20 3 Again, in May 2000 the court articulated the
constitutional values involved and attempted to give substance to the concept
of a "thorough and efficient" public education." 20 4 By the time the court
referred the case to mediation, however, the clarity of the principles involved
had been significantly undermined-if not totally uprooted-by the DeRolph
III compromise decision. The decision appeared to yield to political
resistance to its earlier orders, backing down from its earlier finding that a
funding system based primarily on local property taxes was constitutionally
defective.20 5 Worse, however, than the apparent concessions on earlier
declared principles, the court failed to enunciate any new principles to
explain its resolution of the issues. Moreover, although the court's
compromise did not state new principles or reasons sufficient to justify its
conclusions, it did choose to "split the baby" in a very specific way. The
DeRolph III decision provided a very specific remedy-the inclusion of
different factors in certain funding equations, and full funding of other
provisions. 20 6 The decision was intended to end debate, not to serve as a
framework for continued discussion. When it became apparent that the
decision to split the baby did not end debate because the numbers it was
based on were incorrect, the case was referred to a mediator in a context
where one might appropriately assume that the only issue to be decided was:
"How can we adjust the existing funding formulas in a way that will result in
a financial resolution closest to the one that the court intended in the
DeRolph III decision?" This very narrow question does not lend itself well to
creative thinking about options and the generation of win-win solutions.20 7
202 See generally DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997); DeRolph II, 728 N.E.2d
993 (Ohio 2000).
203 See supra text accompanying notes 90-94.
204 See supra text accompanying notes 116-20.
205 See supra text accompanying notes 138-49.
206 See supra text accompanying notes 141-48.
207 Professor Nancy Welsh argues that mediation most often results in distributive
rather than "win-win" settlements. See Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-
Connected Mediation, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 787, 813 (2001). Even if creative settlements do
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Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion to the order referring the case
to mediation, expressed his view that the mediator could consider not only
the matters raised in the State's motion to reconsider, but also any other
issues in the case, including a complete systematic overhaul of the state's
school funding system. 20 8 It, seems unlikely, however, that once a majority of
the court had endorsed the basic provisions of a school-funding scheme (as
the court did in DeRolph III) that the state would agree to consider any
remedy that would fundamentally alter those basic provisions. Thus, the
DeRolph III decision substantially impaired the ability of the parties to
fashion their own remedy, depriving the mediation process of its greatest
potential.
B. Identifying and Including Stakeholders
In convening any mediation, the first obligation of a successful mediator
is to make sure that all of the stakeholders in the conflict have been identified
and are either present at the table or are represented in the process. 20 9
Lengthy discussions and difficult compromises will count for nothing if at
the end of the day parties who were not involved in the process appear and
decide to oppose implementation of the resolution. The experience of the
effort to resolve an Alabama school funding case using a facilitated
settlement process is instructive on this point. There the Circuit Court of
Montgomery County entered an order finding that the system of public
education in Alabama was unconstitutional and directed the legislature to
develop a comprehensive remedy plan with the assistance of a court-
appointed facilitator.210 Over the period of the next several months plaintiffs
not result from mediation, however, she argues that mediation must provide the
participants with the opportunity to explore options, to tell their stories, and to gain the
experience of procedural justice. Id. at 855. The brainstorming and mutual re-education
that occurs in a process with possibilities for a variety of remedial options is valuable,
even if a "win-win" solution is not the outcome. Id. at 858-59.
208DeRolph Mediation, 758 N.E.2d 1113, 1120 (Ohio 2001) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
209 SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, supra note 177, at 101 (productive negotiations
cannot begin until stakeholders are identified and represented); J.B. Ruhl, Thinking of
Mediation as a Complex Adaptive System, 1997 BYU L. REV. 777, 788 ("[Bjasic
mediator training instructs that a mediator should look for issues that require other
participants for full resolution and then ask the mediating parties whether that is not the
case.").
210 Pinto v. Alabama Coalition for Equity, 662 So.2d 894, 897 (Ala. 1995). Initially,
the legislature resisted and sought an advisory opinion from the Alabama Supreme Court
that would declare that the legislature was not under any duty to comply with the Circuit
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and defendants worked together with the facilitator and devised a
comprehensive remedial plan. 211 All of the participants in the case were
satisfied with the plan, which would be implemented subject to the court's
approval following a "fairness hearing." 212 Two days before the scheduled
fairness hearing a group claiming to represent "taxpayers and citizens of
Alabama" moved to intervene and to oppose both the finding of liability and
the proposed remedial plan.213 Although the Circuit Court denied the
petitions to intervene, the interveners were ultimately successful in derailing
the settlement process. 214
The participation of all of the stakeholders, particularly those who will
cause trouble-that is, those who may oppose or thwart the implementation
of any eventual resolution of the dispute-is essential to the process. 215
Gaining the assent of the most vocal activists and the most difficult
opponents of reform is key to the successful implementation of the remedy.
Although the involvement of stakeholders is central to the mediation, the
process by which the interested stakeholders are identified and integrated,
either individually or through representatives, is not uniform. It has been
described as an "art. '216
School finance reform presents a stakeholder palette that would
challenge even the most skillful mediation artist. When Ohio Governor Bob
Taft devised a list of the groups that he believed "are involved in the school
funding debate in one way or another," the list included important
governmental actors, state agencies, and dozens of professional associations
Court order. See Opinion of the Justices, 624 So.2d 107, 110 (Ala. 1993) (holding that the
legislature was required to comply with the Circuit Court order.)
211 See Pinto, 662 So.2d at 897.
212 Id.
213 Id. Michael Rebell describes the intervenors as "a number of religious and parent
groups who asserted that they had been excluded from the decision-making process."
Rebell & Hughes, supra note 179, at 1157.
214 In Pinto, the Supreme Court heard the petitions to intervene and decided that the
taxpayer group was entitled to intervene in the remedial phase of the litigation. 662 So.2d
at 899. In later proceedings the Alabama Supreme Court dismissed the case, holding that
the issue of school finance was a non-justiciable political question. See generally Ex
parte James, 2002 WL 1150823 (Ala. May 31, 2002).
215 HALL, supra note 165, at 35.
216 Interview with Professor Douglas H. Yam, in Atlanta, Ga. (Sept. 6, 2002). The
process may vary according to the particular mediator and the particular dispute.
Common practices are described in SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, supra note 177, at 101-
08. See also CARPENTER & KENNEDY, supra note 71, at 168-75 (2001) (discussing how
various constituencies may be represented and involved in the resolution of a public
dispute).
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and private citizens groups. 217 The challenge of engaging and involving large
numbers of interested parties in a public policy mediation, however, is one
that skilled mediators have faced repeatedly and have successfully
addressed. 218 Consensus-building processes have been used to resolve a wide
variety of public policy issues and disputes. 219 Issues of representation and
217 See "Building Blocks, An Ohio School Funding Resource," at
http://www.ohioschoolfunding.org/resources/index.asp (last visited Sept. 15, 2002). The
list of interested actors and groups included the following: (governmental actors)
Governor Bob Taft, Ohio Department of Taxation, Ohio General Assembly; (State
agencies) Office of Budget and Management (OBM), Ohio Department of Education
(ODE), Ohio School Facilities Commission (OSFC), Ohio SchoolNet Commission;
(professional associations) American Association of Retired Persons, American
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, Association of Christian Schools
International, Buckeye Association of School Administrators (BASA), Catholic
Conference of Ohio, Children's Defense Fund of Ohio, Cincinnati Federation of
Teachers, National Alliance of Black School Educators, National Federation of
Independent Businesses-Ohio, National Governor's Association (NGA), National
Middle School Association, Ohio Association for Gifted Children, Ohio Association for
Supervision and Curriculum Development, Ohio Association of Child Care Agencies,
Ohio Association of Elementary School Administrators, Ohio Association of Pupil
Services Administrators, Ohio Association of School Business Officials (OASBO), Ohio
Association of Secondary School Administrators, Ohio Association of Supervisors and
Work-Study Coordinators, Ohio Chamber of Commerce, Ohio Education Association
(OEA), Ohio Farm Bureau Federation, Inc., Ohio Manufacturers Association, Ohio
Middle School Association, Ohio School Boards Association (OSBA), Ohio School
Counselors Association, Ohio School Psychologists Association, Ohio AFL-CIO, Ohio
Vocational Association, The Ohio Public Expenditure Council, KnowledgeWorks,
Education Tax Policy Institute; (Private Citizens Groups) Coalition of Rural &
Appalachian Schools, League of Women Voters of Ohio, National Taxpayers Union,
Ohio Coalition for Equity & Adequacy of School Funding, Ohio Coalition for the
Education of Children with Disabilities, Ohio Coalition of Essential Schools, Ohio
Congress of Parents and Teachers, Ohio Roundtable, Ohio Taxpayers Association, The
Buckeye Institute, The New Ohio Institute, Americans for Tax Reform.
218 Robert Zeinemann, The Characterization of Public Sector Mediation, 24
ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL'Y J. 49, 53-54 (2001) (asserts that mediation is increasingly
used to resolve public disputes and suggests some reasons why).
219 See, e.g., Freeman & Langbein, supra note 70, at 10811; Policy Consensus
Initiative, Governing Tools for the 21sf Century: How State Leaders Are Using
Collaborative Problem Solving and Dispute Resolution (2002) (describing existing
programs using consensus building processes to resolve public disputes in 12 states);
GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 68, at 485-511 (describing the use of ADR processes to
resolve disputes of public importance).
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management of the process, while complex, are nevertheless familiar and can
be successfully managed by a skillful mediator or team of mediators. 220
On the other hand, litigation pending in court is not typically held open
for public participation. 221 Including the interested constituencies in
mediating a school finance lawsuit would require a process that would reach
beyond the litigants named in the action. Involving various non-litigant
members of the public in the remedial process of pending litigation
concerning constitutional rights with broad impact is not unprecedented. 222
Including non-litigants in court-ordered mediation may, in fact, be widely
practiced with the consent of the litigating parties. Using an inclusive,
consensus-building process at the intersection of public-policy facilitation
and private litigation may be a common mode of dealing with litigation that
has broad public impact, but the practice is not generally documented.
To be clear, the process I envision would not be "open to the public" in
the common sense of that expression. Rather, interested groups would be
identified by the mediator or team of mediators, who would choose
representatives and would form sub-groups or coalitions based on their areas
of interest or expertise. The mediator, in consultation with the litigating
parties, would control the size and composition of the participant group.223
While the prospect of identifying representatives from an almost unlimited
group of interested stakeholders may appear daunting, in fact, the time
commitment and real work obligation of a mediation process acts to limit the
220 SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, supra note 177, at 37.
221 See FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a) (Intervention of Right); OHIO R. CIV. P. 24(a)
(Intervention of Right).
222 See, e.g., Pottinger v. City of Miami, 76 F.3d 1154 (11 th Cir. 1996) (directing
parties to meet to settle the case); Kathy Glasgow, The City of Miami's Court-Approved
Plan to Deal with the Homeless, MIAMI NEW TIMES, Dec. 24, 1998 (describing the
resolution of a civil rights action involving the rights of the homeless population of the
City of Miami that required the participation of homeless advocates, city officials,
neighborhood organizations, shelter personnel, police and others).
223 After the stakeholders have been identified and have been convened, the next
task of the mediator is to empower the participants so that they own the process from the
very beginning. The participants should plan the process: They should agree on a
timetable and a process design that would include information exchange, generation of
alternative solutions, evaluation, decision-making and implementation. The resulting
scheme may require the commitment of a full-time process manager and may require
more than a year of work. See HALL, supra note 165, at 37. The Court should permit the
mediator to be flexible in working with the parties over an indefinite period to attempt to
achieve a resolution. On the other hand, periodic progress reports to the Court must be
required to ensure that one or several of the parties are not dragging their feet to avoid
implementation of any remedy.
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participants to those whose interest in the outcome is substantial. 224 The
participants will be, in a sense, self-selected. Further, if sheer numbers of
participants prohibits productive discussions, the mediator may use several
strategies for managing the work without excluding participants. 225 While the
mediation may take longer and be more difficult to manage with the
inclusion of a large number of participants, the inclusion of those participants
will ensure the success of the any settlement that may ultimately be reached.
Involving a broad range of interested constituencies in an effort to
resolve school finance issues simply makes sense. Consensus building
processes have been used successfully in a wide range of school disputes. 226
Further, the kind of wide-ranging reform required in a school finance case
may not be possible to implement without broad-based public support. 227
Moreover, the major litigant named in the lawsuit, the General Assembly, is
not an individual, but a public body. Members of the General Assembly
represent diverse constituencies and are subject to conflicting pressures
exerted by various interest groups, activists, and lobbying organizations. 228
Elected officials must, to a large extent, guess about the priorities of their
constituents. Members of the General Assembly might be loath to make a
224 See HALL, supra note 165, at 35.
225 See CARPENTER & KENNEDY, supra note 71, at 100-36 (discussing strategies,
procedures and ground rules for managing public policy disputes).
226 See, e.g., Amy Totenberg, "Use of Special Masters in Complex Litigation,"
JAMS ATLANTA NEWSLETTER 1 (Spring 2002) (describing mediation of standards for
disengagement in a case involving special education); Rebell & Hughes, supra note 11, at
114-36 (proposing a community dialogic model for resolving conflict relating to school
reform).
227 Jonathan R. Werner, No Knight In Shining Armor: Why Courts Alone, Absent
Public Engagement, Could Not Achieve Successful Public School Finance Reform In
West Virginia, 35 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 61, 62-63 (2002) ("The kind of sweeping
change the decision envisioned required broad support for the court's action through a
coordinated, multi-faceted effort targeted at garnering the support of legislators,
taxpayers, school districts, and other key players.").
228 There is, of course, a rich literature examining the legislative decision-making
process. See generally JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE (1997);
DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION (1991); Dwight R. Lee, Politics, Ideology, and the Power of Public
Choice, 74 VA. L. REv. 191 (1988); Daniel A. Farber, Democracy and Disgust:
Reflections on Public Choice, 65 CHI. KENT L. REv. 161 (1989). But see Cass R.
Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1550-52 (1988)
(describing modern civic republican thought that is characterized by a commitment to
values-oriented deliberation in politics, rather than horse-trading). I do not hope here to
undertake an analysis of influences on legislators as they deliberate, horse-trade, or
follow their consciences in making legislative choices.
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concession during a mediation in an area in which they perceive themselves
to be politically vulnerable, especially if core constituencies have expressed
opposition to making concessions prior to the mediation.229 Elected officials
left to work toward a mediated solution in a closed process are, in essence,
subject to the same pressures that created the already existing
unconstitutional legislative scheme. In contrast, if the mediation process is
open and its boundaries permeable, various individual interest groups can be
allowed to express their points of view for themselves. Stakeholders who are
present and involved can be encouraged through the process to understand
the views of other parties, and can be encouraged to work toward
collaborative solutions. In face-to-face problem solving sessions,
stakeholders may be heard and their priorities may be realistically assessed
and reordered. 230 The participation of a wide variety of interested groups
would allow legislators to change their positions with the assurance that their
constituents have considered the options and have been persuaded of the
wisdom of the new solution. Finally, the process may provide a scapegoat for
the legislature, allowing representatives to avoid taking political heat for
changed positions or controversial votes. 231
In its order referring the Ohio school finance case to mediation, the
Supreme Court identified the plaintiffs, and the defendants-members of the
Ohio General Assembly, the Ohio Board of Education, the Ohio
Superintendent of Education, and the Ohio Department of Education-
through their counsel, as the participants in the process. 232 The court further
invited Governor Bob Taft, through counsel, to participate as a party for
"purposes of the settlement conference." 233 These parties were, it appeared,
the minimum necessary for any potentially binding settlement. Nevertheless,
the State challenged the court's identification of the parties to be included in
the mediation, objecting specifically to the designation of the Attorney
General as counsel to represent the State and to the participation of the amici
counsel, who represented minority party members of the General
229 Public choice theorists examining legislative process view legislators as rational
bargainers who are motivated by a desire to be re-elected. See generally supra note 212.
230 CARPENTER & KENNEDY, supra note 7 1, at 18-52 (describing methods for group
problem solving and alternative approaches to managing conflict).
231 See FRANK M. JOHNSON, DEFENDING CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, 20-21 (Tony
Freyer, ed., 2001) (describing how the federal courts provided a scapegoat for political
actors who could not publicly support desegregation of southern facilities).
232 DeRolph Mediation, 758 N.E.2d 1113, 1116-17 (Ohio 2001).
2 33 Id. at 1117.
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Assembly.234 The Supreme Court rejected the State's arguments, pointing
out that the defendants had consented to the participation of the identified
attorneys throughout the life of the litigation.235 The court further pointed
out,
Experience has demonstrated that a satisfactory result is fostered in public-
policy mediations as-contrasted with private dispute mediations involving
individuals-by including representatives expressing the full range of
competing interests. 236
In the Ohio school finance case, the court may have intended to permit
the mediator to do the hard work of identifying the stakeholders and
convening an inclusive process, but its order setting up the mediation did not
express a vision of a broad-based, participatory process. The order appointed
a single mediator and allowed for an initial six weeks to attempt to settle the
case. The mediator faced immediate opposition to including even the parties
who had participated in the litigation during the previous ten years. In this
context, it may have been impossible to convene anything but the most
constrained and limited group. If, on the other hand, the court had--early in
the remedial phase of the litigation-entered a mediation order that
appointed a team of mediators, that encouraged or required the parties to
involve and include interested non-party stakeholders, and that set up
generous time-frame, the important work of including the interested parties
could have been done.
V. CONCLUSION
Following the failure of the DeRolph mediation, the Ohio Supreme Court
granted the State's motion to reconsider the DeRolph III decision.237
Vacating DeRolph III in its entirety, the Court returned to the reasoning and
the result of the DeRolph I and DeRolph II decisions. 238 Once again, the
Court held that the legislature had not fulfilled its Constitutional duty to
234 DeRolph v. State, 760 N.E.2d 351, 352-54 (Ohio 2001)
235 Id. at 353.
236 Id. at 355.
237 DeRolph IV, 780 N.E.2d 529 (2002).
238 Id. The decision on the motion for reconsideration resurrected the four-
member majority of the DeRolph I and DeRolph II decisions. Justice Pfeifer, who
had joined the DeRolph III majority, returned to his earlier position and wrote the
opinion for a majority that included justices Resnick, Sweeney and Douglas. Id. at
529.
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provide a "thorough and efficient system of common schools. '239 And, once
again, the Court gave no specific guidance to the legislature as to how to
enact a constitutional school funding system beyond reiterating that a
"complete systematic overhaul" of the school funding system is needed. 240
The remedy in the DeRolph case remains to be devised. 241 Further litigation
relating to the remedy is likely.
School finance cases present difficult, complex, and seemingly
intractable remedial issues. Litigation and its traditional remedial processes
provide an unsatisfactorily blunt tool for the task of re-designing a complex
school funding system. 242 Mediation, on the other hand, may be the device
that is most ideally crafted for the job. Mediation as a process holds promise
for resolving school finance reform litigation because it can provide a
flexible procedure that may address the needs for the participation of a
diverse and large number of constituencies; technical expertise and forward-
looking decision-making about complex issues; and consensus-building that
will facilitate the cooperation among the various public entities involved in
implementing the remedy. Mediation could lead to qualitatively superior
solutions, through the information-sharing and mutual education involved in
face-to-face negotiation sessions. (Certainly, the embarrassment of DeRolph
Ill-in which the court based its decision on incomplete budget numbers-
could have been avoided if the state parties had been involved in making the
remedial calculations. 243) A mediated process could give various
constituencies an opportunity to participate in the development of the
remedy, and thereby contribute to the legitimacy of the eventual solution.
Mediation could also contribute to the stability and long-term success of the
school reform remedy by creating grass-roots support for implementation of
the remedy and by creating avenues of communication among the various
interested parties. Even after the failure of the mediation effort in this case,
239 Id. at 530.
240 Id. at 533. In this author's view, in failing to devise a remedial procedure to
enforce the finding of a constitutional violation, the court has side-stepped an
important constitutional duty. The court ought not abdicate its responsibility to the
plaintiffs because of the difficulty of devising a remedy. See Sturm, supra note 8, at
1379 (discussing the theory of the court's remedial power).
241 As Chief Justice Moyer pointed out in his dissent, the majority said "nothing
concerning enforcement of its reaffirmed declaration that the current school-funding
system is unconstitutional. It neither retains jurisdiction nor remands the cause to the
trial court." Id. at 537 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting).
242 See supra text accompanying notes 43-64.
243 DeRolph III, 758 N.E. 2d 1113, 1120 (Ohio 2001); see also supra notes 130-33.
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comments made by the mediator, Howard S. Bellman, indicated that he
believed that mediation was, perhaps, a viable avenue for resolution of the
case.
There is never a time when education policy is all done. Education policy is
dynamic, and the environment in which it exists-the economy, the
technology, the expectations that society has of the schools-all those shift
around, and education has to adapt. Are you going to have a court tell you
the answer every week? The real question is how will these controversies be
handled? By warring camps in adversarial roles or by a consensus seeking,
congenial process?
244
Mediation was not the wrong answer in this case. Instead, the
mediation-as ordered-was too much, too little, too late. It was too much
constricted by the court's compromise on the remedy. 245 It was too little
supported by clear statements regarding the rights and remedial principles
that should have guided the mediation process and therefore generated too
little motivation to settle. 246 Finally, by the time mediation was ordered it
was too late, because the court's authority to give guidance on the matters
that might have put an effective mediation process in motion had been
seriously impaired by the compromise decision of September 2001.247
In vacating the compromise DeRolph III decision, however, the Court
may have provided itself and the parties with a new window of opportunity.
It may not be too late after all. The parties may now voluntarily engage in a
facilitated negotiation process to effect the implementation of a
constitutionally sound public school funding system. Alternatively, if the
parties return to court in the future, the court will have a new opportunity to
structure a participatory remediation process that is designed for success.
The lesson of the DeRolph case is not that court-ordered mediation
cannot contribute to the successful resolution of difficult institutional reform
litigation. Rather, DeRolph teaches that mediation is more likely to play a
positive role in the resolution of an important institutional reform case if it is
considered as a primary avenue of achieving remedial results rather than as a
very last resort. Further, any court considering whether to order the
mediation of an important institutional reform case should be attentive to
creating a substantive and procedural framework that will support the parties'
244 Editorial, The Last Word, COLUMBus DISPATCH, Mar. 24, 2002, at D2.
245 See supra text accompanying notes 113-23.
246 See supra text accompanying notes 152-63.
247 See supra text accompanying notes 114-22.
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motivation and effort to devise their own remedy. The court should also
consider the legitimacy benefit that may accrue from the participation of a
broad group of interested constituencies and construct a framework that
supports the mediator's efforts to identify and include stakeholders.
Supported by a clear and unequivocal statement declaring the rights of the
parties and remedial principles and a mediation order outlining fall-back
remedial procedures that will be implemented if resolution is not achieved
and creating incentives to permit participation by a broad range of non-
litigant stakeholders, future institutional reform mediations need not fail.
